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Abstract
A central area of current philosophical debate in the foundations of mathe-
matics concerns whether or not there is a single, maximal, universe of set the-
ory. Universists maintain that there is such a universe, while Multiversists argue
that there are many universes, no one of which is ontologically privileged. Of-
ten model-theoretic constructions that add sets to models are cited as evidence
in favour of the latter. This paper informs this debate by developing a way for
a Universist to interpret talk that seems to necessitate the addition of sets to V .
We argue that, despite the prima facie incoherence of such talk for the Universist,
she nonetheless has reason to try and provide interpretation of this discourse.
We present a method of interpreting extension-talk (V -logic), and show how it
captures satisfaction in ‘ideal’ outer models and relates to impredicative class
theories. We provide some reasons to regard the technique as philosophically
virtuous, and argue that it opens new doors to philosophical and mathematical
discussions for the Universist.
Introduction
Recent discussions of the philosophy of set theory have often focussed whether there
is a maximal set-theoretic universe or structure for our discourse about sets.1 We
begin with two views:
Universism. There is a proper-class-sized universe (denoted by ‘V ’),
which is (a) unique, (b) cannot be extended, and (c) and contains all the
sets.
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However, some have seen set-theoretic results (such as forcing and ultrapowers)
as providing evidence that the subject matter of set theory is not constituted by some
single ‘absolute’ universe, but rather a plurality of different universes.2 Universism
thus contrasts sharply with the following view:
Multiversism. The subject matter of set theory is constituted by a plu-
rality of different universes, and no single one of them contains all3 the
sets.
This question of ontology can be linked to the following idea: Do set theorists
merely study models of set theory (similar to a group theorist’s study of groups),
or can set theory be understood as about a single domain of sets? The former idea
is naturally motivated by Multiversism, and the latter by Universism. The current
paper concerns how a Universist might bring a version of the algebraic Multiverse-
inspired perspective to bear on her universe of sets.
There are severalways of fleshing outMultiversism. For instance, one might hold
that the intended universes contain all the ordinals, but that subsets can be added to
any given universe.4 Alternatively, one might hold that there is a definite powerset
operation, but any universe can be extended to another with more ordinals.5 Still
further, one might take a universe to be extendable both by adding more ordinals
and/or by adding subsets.6 Some views advocate that in addition to extension by
adding subsets and ordinals, every intended universe is non-well-founded from the
perspective of another.7
The present paper is concerned with how we might interpret width extensions
of universes (i.e. the addition of subsets but not ordinals) for the Universist, clari-
fying the dialectic with respect to certain constructions in set theory (which we dis-
cuss later), and showing how she can use resources one might be tempted to think
are prohibited. We will therefore contrast Universism with the following species of
Multiversism:
Width Multiversism. Letting V be a variable ranging over universes, for
any particular set-theoretic universe V , there is another universe V ′ such
that:
(i) V ′ is an end extension of V (i.e. V ′ does not add new elements to sets
already in V).
(ii) V is a proper subclass of V ′.
(iii) V and V ′ have the same ordinals.
One critique of the Universist’s position from width multiversists concerns how
they are able to interpret talk of width extensions (i.e. constructions that add subsets,
but not ordinals, to some V).8 Aswe shall argue in detail later, certain axioms appear
to require higher-order relations between universes and their extensions in order
2See here, for example, [Hamkins, 2012] or [Steel, 2014].
3Of course, the Multiversist is likely to run into the usual problems of expressibility and general-
ity relativism here with their use of the quantifier ‘all’. There are options available, however—see
[Rayo and Uzquiano, 2006] for an excellent collection of essays on the topic.
4See [Steel, 2014] and [Meadows, 2015].
5See here [Rumfitt, 2015], [Isaacson, 2011], and [Hellman, 1989], with historical roots in
[Zermelo, 1930].
6See [Arrigoni and Friedman, 2013].
7See [Hamkins, 2012].
8See here [Hamkins, 2012], which we discuss in detail later.
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to be formulated properly. Just to briefly foreshadow, we shall discuss the Inner
Model Hypothesis9, the Axiom of ♯-Generation10, and certain axioms coming from
set-theoretic geology11. This paper is thus addressed towards the following pair of
questions:
(1.) Can the Universist provide an interpretation of the discourse required to formu-
late these extension-requiring axioms as concerned with V ?
(2.) How natural is the interpretation they can provide?
We shall argue for the following claims:
(I) If one holds that the Universist should be able to interpret set-theoretic dis-
course naturally (in a sense we make precise later), then there is pressure to
provide an interpretation of axioms that seem concerned with higher-order re-
lations between V and extensions thereof.
(II) There is a logical system (V -logic), formalisable with the use of resources be-
yond first-order, that suffices to provide an interpretation of these axioms.
(III) By arguing for the use of higher-order set theory, and the existence of countable
transitive models elementarily equivalent to V for portions of its higher-order
theory, the Universist can also provide a natural interpretation of these axioms.
The main goal is thus philosophical; to argue that the Universist has a well-
motivated way of interpreting axioms that seem to need extensions of V . However,
along the way we will articulate several mathematical theories and results that are
useful in establishing this conclusion. Some readers may only be interested in the
mathematical details, and these can be understood solely from reading sections 4,5,
and 6. Other readers may not be interested in the mathematical details, in which
case the summary just before the start of section 6 can be treated as a black box, and
sections 4 and 5 skipped. In more detail, here’s the plan:
After these introductory remarks, we discuss (§1) a challenge for the Universist;
to make sense of talk concerning extensions of V . We discuss a constraint on in-
terpreting extensions that motivates Multiversist criticisms—that the interpretation
provided preserve as much naive thinking as possible. We then (§2) discuss a way
in which a Universist might miss insight from extensions of V : One can formulate
axioms using extensions that relate to V . We mention some existing interpretations,
in particular the use of countable transitive models. Next (§3) we identify a way this
strategy (as stated) might be viewed as limited; it fails to account for axioms relating
to higher-order properties. We provide some examples of these; Inner Model Hy-
potheses, ♯-generation, and certain axioms coming from set-theoretic geology. The
next sections (§4, §5, and §6) provide the elements of a positive response to the prob-
lem. §4 provides an exposition of a logical system (V -logic) that suffices to interpret
extensions. §5 then shows how V -logic can be coded within class theory. §6 then dis-
cusses how we can use the mathematical results of §4 and §5 to reduce V -logic to the
countable, and argues that this interpretation is philosophically natural. Finally (§7)
we identify some open questions and conclude that new avenues of philosophical
and mathematical research are opened by this interpretation of extensions.
9See [Friedman, 2006].
10See [Friedman and Honzik, 2016b].
11See [Fuchs et al., 2015].
3
1 Extensions and insight
Before we start getting into the details, some philosophical set up is necessary to
elucidate the problem and some constraints on a solution. In this section we do this
by explaining some commitments a Universist might have, some challenges raised
by criticisms of Universism and the constraints they suggest, and the rough shape of
the problem. Specific examples will then be given more detailed consideration in §2.
One salient feature of the Universist’s position is that often they can find interpre-
tations of statements involving extensions.12 A good example here is with set forcing,
which adds a subset G to a universe V (for nontrivial forcing). From the Universist’s
perspective there are a number of options for interpreting occurrences of terms like
‘V [G]’ in the practice of set theory. They could, for example, interpret this via the
use of the forcing relation or taking ‘V ’ to denote some countable transitive model
of the required form.13 There is thus a question of if and/or why the Universist
should be perturbed by the use of extensions in set-theoretic practice. Width Multi-
versists are well-aware of this strategy and often supplement the mere existence of
model-construction methods with appeals to philosophical desiderata. Hamkins is
a somewhat representative example here:
“A stubborn geometermight insist—like an exotic-traveloguewriter who
never actually ventures west of seventh avenue—that only Euclidean
geometry is real and that all the various non-Euclidean geometries are
merely curious simulations within it. Such a position is self-consistent,
although stifling, for it appears to miss out on the geometrical insights
that can arise from the other modes of reasoning. Similarly, a set theorist
with the universe view can insist on an absolute background universe
V , regarding all forcing extensions and other models as curious complex
simulations within it. (I have personally witnessed the necessary contor-
tions for class forcing.) Such a perspectivemay be entirely self-consistent,
and I am not arguing that the universe view is incoherent, but rather, my
point is that if one regards all outer models of the universe as merely sim-
ulated inside it via complex formalisms, one may miss out on insights
that could arise from the simpler philosophical attitude taking them as
fully real.” ([Hamkins, 2012], p426)
Central to Hamkins’ point is that often set-theorists will examine extensions of
universes whilst using the symbol ‘V ’ to denote the ground model. ‘V ’ and terms
for sets in the extension cannot literally denote V and sets in an extension of V for the
Universist, as in that case there would be sets outside V (by the design of the extend-
ing construction), and hence her position would be false. Thus, she has to reinterpret
use of the relevant theoretical terms so as not to commit herself to sets outside V (for
example, in the case of forcing extensions, through the use of the forcing relation,
countable transitive models, or Boolean ultrapower map). Hamkins’ point is that
the kinds of interpretation given (in his words “curious complex simulations”) ob-
scure possible mathematical insight. While we remain agnostic on to what degree
the Universist should be troubled by Hamkins’ remarks, it is nonetheless a worth-
while philosophical and mathematical endeavour (and an important motivator for
this paper) to examine ways in which the Universist might counteract this potential
loss of mathematical ‘insight’. A few remarks are thus in order to clarify what this
might come down to.
12In certain cases they may need to use large cardinals, but we suppress this detail for the moment.
13For some philosophical discussion of these options regarding forcing see [Barton, 2018].
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One important point that we will spell out in detail later is that there are axioms
that appear to require the use of extensions of V in their formulation, and this is the
problem that forms the focus of this paper. We will examine interpretations that le-
gitimise the use of such talk on the Universist’s picture. The position is somewhat
similar to the one Hilbert took concerning infinite sets (under one interpretation of a
period of Hilbert’s thought)—infinite sets for him are fictitious but discourse involv-
ing them might be useful insofar as it facilitates an understanding of finitary objects.
Similarly for the Universist, axioms involving extensions are useful insofar as they
allow us to make claims concerning V , even if the extensions do not strictly speaking
exist. We therefore pose the following:
Hilbertian Challenge.14 Provide philosophical reasons to legitimise the
use of extra-V resources for formulating axioms concerning V .
Before we embark on the details, a salient question here is exactly how the Hilber-
tian Challenge should be answered. It is one thing to provide an interpretation of
extensions, and another for that interpretation to be good or natural facilitating the
‘insight’ Hamkins talks about. In order to examine the strongest possible challenge
to Universism, we therefore impose the following additional constraint:
The Methodological Constraint. In responding to the Hilbertian Chal-
lenge, do so in a way that accounts for as much as possible of our naive
thinking about extensions and links it to structural features of V . In par-
ticular, if we wish to apply an extending construction to V , there should
be an actual set-theoretic model, resembling V as much as possible, that
has an extension similar to the one we would like V to have.15
Immediately there is a problem: the most ‘naive’ way of interpreting the talk
would simply be to interpret ‘V ’ as denoting V , and ‘ideal’ sets as denoting actual
sets outside V , which is obviously problematic. However, we should keep in mind
that the Universist only wishes to make claims (to be discussed later) about sets in V
using talk that appears to involve external to V resources. She is thus not interested
in objects that would have to be outside V were they to exist. Rather her interest is in
the objects of V , and how our thinking relates to them. Thus, the challenge is to see
how much of our naive thinking can be interpreted on her picture, without actually
committing to the existence of sets outside V .
In [Barton, 2018], the second author argued that many insights relating to forc-
ing could be captured through the use of a countable transitive model elementarily
equivalent to V . Here we will extend this line of thought, arguing that a Univer-
sist can capture far more than one might think (even statements concerning certain
higher-order axioms) and that this paves the way for new and interesting philosoph-
ical and mathematical discussions from Universist points of view. In particular, we
14We use the name ‘Hilbertian Challenge’ to echo Hilbert’s desire to show that transfinite resources
would never lead to finitary contradiction. Of course, by Go¨del’s Second Incompleteness Theorem,
Hilbert’s Programme in its original form was doomed from the outset (though for a heroic defence of
Hilbert’s aims see [Detlefsen, 1986], [Detlefsen, 1990], and [Detlefsen, 2001]). In the present context then,
we want to provide philosophical and mathematical reasons to accept the use of extension-talk in formu-
lating axioms about V . There is a substantial and interesting question as to how Hilbertian this challenge
really is. We certainly do not claim that it accords with all of Hilbert’s writing. Indeed, one might take
Hilbert as requiring conservativity rather than merely a lack of contradictions. All we wish to identify here
is that there are certain parallels between Hilbertian Finitism and Universism. Thanks to Giorgio Venturi
for emphasising this point.
15A similar constraint is examined solely with respect to forcing constructions in [Barton, 2018], where
some conditions on the ‘naturalness’ of interpretations of forcing are discussed.
5
shall argue that we can capture more than just forcing extensions, but can in fact
naturally interpret talk concerning arbitrary extensions of V on a Universist picture.
Indeed, we shall show that using some impredicative class theory, we can capture
satisfaction in arbitrary outer models in which V appears standard. This provides
a definition of satisfaction in both forcing extensions of various kinds and also non-
forcing extensions (such as if V resulted from a generating sharp). Reduction of this
situation to the countable (again, possibly using impredicative class theory) then
facilitates a philosophically virtuous way of interpreting extension-talk for a Univer-
sist.
2 Formulating axioms with extensions
With the philosophical backdrop in place, we will now state the rough abstract shape
of the problem we shall consider. In formulating axioms, we shall see that the use
of ‘ideal’ objects outside V can lead to triviality or apparent falsehood, even when
we are trying to make a claim about objects within V . Before we dig into the details,
a toy example is helpful to understand how consideration of extensions might be
useful for making a claim about V . LetΦ and Ξ be conditions on universes. Suppose
we wish to assert the following principle about V :
(Principle-ΞV ) If there is a proper width extension of V such that Φ, then
Ξ holds of V .
The problemwith Principle-ΞV is that, given a naive interpretation, it will always
come out as true, but fail to capture the intended aspect of V (namely that Ξ holds of
V ). For the antecedent (on its natural reading) is trivially false, and so the conditional
is true. But this provides us with no reason to think that Ξ is actually true of V which,
presumably, was the intended consequence of asserting the putative axiom in the
first place.
Some axioms can indeed be formulated in this way. Consider the following case.
Martin’s Axiom is a well-known proposed axiom, and is normally formulated as fol-
lows:16
Definition 1. (ZFC)Martin’s Axiom. Let κ be a cardinal such that κ < |P(ω)|. MA(κ)
is the claim that for any partial order P in which all maximal antichains are countable
(i.e. P has the countable chain condition), and any family D of dense sets of P such
that |D| ≤ κ, there is a filter F on P such that for every D ∈ D, F ∩D 6= ∅. Martin’s
Axiom (orMA) is then the claim that ∀κ < |P(ω)|,MA(κ).
Effectively, Martin’s Axiom rendered in this form states that the universe has
already been saturated under forcing of a certain kind.17 However, we could equiv-
alently formulate Martin’s Axiom as the following absoluteness principle:
Definition 2. (ZFC) [Bagaria, 1997] Absolute-MA. We say that M satisfies Absolute-
MA iff whenever M[G] is a generic extension of M by a partial order P with the
countable chain condition in M, and φ(x) is a Σ1(P(ω1)) formula (i.e. a first-order
formula containing only parameters from P(ω1)), ifM[G] |= ∃xφ(x) then there is a y
inM such that φ(y).
16One can also find a use of this analogy in [Barton and Friedman, 2017].
17The same goes for other forcing axioms such as the Proper Forcing Axiom.
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This version of Martin’s Axiom is interesting given our current focus; it asserts
that if something is true in an extension of a particular kind, then it already holds in
M.18
Suppose then that the Universist is only aware of Absolute-MA and not Martin’s
Axiom as usually stated. Supposing that she viewed it as a natural maximality prin-
ciple, could she meaningfully analyse the axiom for its truth or falsity in V despite
its apparent reference to extensions?
The answer is clearly “Yes!”. This is because (as will be familiar to specialists)
despite the fact that the Universist does not countenance the literal existence of the
extensions, she can nonetheless capture the notion of satisfaction in a particular set-
generic forcing extension using formulas that are first-order definable over V . More
specifically, given a formula φ (or set of formulas of some bounded complexity), the
Universist can define a class of P-names in V , and a relation P (known as a forcing
relation) such that: For p ∈ P, if p were in some (‘ideal’, ‘non-existent’) P-generic G,
and p P φ holds in V , then V [G] would have to satisfy φwere it to exist. Moreover,
if some ‘ideal’ V [G] were to satisfy φ, then there is a q ∈ G ⊆ P such that q P φ.19
In this way, her various V have access to the satisfaction relation of ‘ideal’ outer
models. To be clear, from the Universist perspective, all she is really doing here is
schematically talking about the various relations P for the relevant φ, and various
q ∈ P in her model, it just so happens that this talk of P mimics what would be
true in extensions of V (were they to exist). The Universist can then reformulate
Absolute-MA as follows:
Definition 3. (ZFC) Absolute-MAP . We say that V satisfies Absolute-MAP iff
whenever P ∈ V is a partial order with the countable chain condition in V , and
φ(x) is a Σ1(P(ω1)) formula, if there is a p ∈ P and P, such that p P ∃xφ(x), then
there is a y in V such that φ(y).
Thus, by coding satisfaction in outer models (without admitting their existence),
the Universist can express the content of Absolute-MA through Absolute-MAP .20
Now, the use of such a forcing relation is very syntactic, and so it is unclear how the
Methodological Constraint is satisfied—there is no model very similar to V being
extended. However, it is well-known that if one moves to a countable transitive
model M of the required form, many extensions of M are readily available, and
some of these models can bear a close resemblance to V . It is then false (as Hamkins
acknowledges) to say that the Universist cannot provide an interpretation on which
the set theorist’s statements come out as true. It is simply that, given many of the
interpretations, ‘V ’ does not denote V . Koellner expresses the point as follows:
“Hamkins’ aim is to “legitimize the actual practice of forcing, as it is used
by set theorists”... The background is this: Set theorists often use ‘V ’ in-
stead of ‘M ’ and so write ‘V [G]’. But if V is the entire universe of sets
then V [G] is an “illusion”. What are we to make of this? Most set theo-
rists would say that it is just an abuse of notation. When one is proving
an independence result and one invokes a transitive modelM of ZFC to
formM [G] one wants to underscore the fact thatM could have been any
transitive model of ZFC and to signal that it is convenient to express the
universality using a special symbol. The special symbol chosen is ‘V ’.
18For a discussion of the naturalness and status of Absolute-MA as an axiom, see [Bagaria, 2005].
19See [Kunen, 2013], Ch. IV (esp. §IV.5.2) for details.
20This will, of course, be equivalent to the standard version of Martin’s Axiom. See [Bagaria, 1997] for
details.
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This symbol thus has a dual use in set theory—it is used to denote the
universe of sets and (in a given context) it is used as a free-variable to
denote any countable transitive model (of the relevant background the-
ory).” ([Koellner, 2013], p19)
Koellner’s point here is that the Universist can interpret extension constructions
(in particular those concerned with independence), by moving to a countable tran-
sitive model (where extensions are uncontroversially available) and conducting the
construction there. To transfer the strategy to the current case, we could argue that
axioms using extension talk concerning V could be formulated about a countable
transitive model M satisfying ZFC, and then whatever is proved about M merely
on the basis of its ZFC-satisfaction can be exported back to V .
We defer a detailed consideration of extant interpretations of certain kinds of
extension-talk (e.g. forcing) to different work.21 Nonetheless, a review of the chal-
lenges faced and a standard response will be helpful for seeing the main aims and
strategy of the current paper.
We start by nothing the following weakness in the countable transitive model
strategy (as stated) for the purposes of interpreting axioms concerning V that make
mention of extensions: There is no guarantee that M and V satisfy the same sen-
tences (though they agree on ZFC). This is of central importance in the current
context, part of the point of asserting new axioms for the Universist is to reduce
independence concerning V , and so we require (according to the Methodological
Constraint) as much similarity between V and a countable transitive model as pos-
sible.
The situation can be somewhat remedied by having a countable transitive model
that satisfies exactly the same parameter-free first-order sentences as V . We will de-
note such an object byV. Later (§6)wewill discuss possible reasonswhy a Universist
might accept the existence of such an entity, however for now let us assume that such
a V exists to see the rough shape of a response to the Hilbertian Challenge. On this
picture, when a theorist uses the term ‘extension of V ’, we interpret them as talk-
ing about some V (which is elementarily equivalent to V ) and its relationship to V .
We have a model, very similar to V that really is being extended. Any result in the
first-order language of ZFC that holds in V can then be exported back to V via the
elementary equivalence. Moreover, we have an explanation of how talk of forcing
over V is related to forcing in the context of V , both V and V will have forcing rela-
tions for the relevant formulas and partial-orders, it is just that in the case ofV these
relations correspond to the actual existence of generics. Use of a countable transitive
model elementarily equivalent to V is thus a viable alternative for interpreting ex-
tension talk in line with the Hilbertian Challenge and Methodological Constraint, at
least as far as parameter-free first-order truth goes. Whilst there are other options
for how one might interpret extensions of V (such as via use of a forcing relation or
Boolean-valued models, or considering substructures of V obtained by a Boolean ul-
trapower map), for now we will simply take it as given that the countable transitive
model strategy works well for parameter-free first-order truth:22 We have a model
very similar to V actually being extended and explained how it is linked to truth in
V . This is the rough form of problem and response we shall articulate in the rest of
21Hamkins himself has several criticisms of these techniques (including the countable transitive model
strategy) which the second author addresses in [Barton, 2018]. For examination of axioms using countable
transitive models elementarily equivalent to V (or some V), see also [Arrigoni and Friedman, 2013] and
[Antos et al., 2015].
22These options, and why we might regard the countable transitive model strategy as privileged, are
discussed by the second author in [Barton, 2018].
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the paper, but with respect to arbitrary extensions.
The core difficulty, to be explained in the next section and overcome in the sec-
tions thereafter, is that we might still regard this version of the countable transitive
model strategy as somewhat limited. In particular, there are axioms that we can
state using higher-order resources in combination with extensions, for which such a
V might not be appropriately linked to truth in V . If we want to allow for interpre-
tation of these axioms, we require a modification of the countable transitive model
strategy. The next section (§3) provides an exposition of these axioms, before we
show how to modify the countable transitive model strategy to accommodate them
(§§4,5,6).
3 Higher-order axioms
This section provides exposition of several axioms that possibly require more for
their satisfactory formulation than what we can guarantee through the existence of
a countable transitive model elementarily equivalent to V . In particular, as we shall
see, the issue concerns the resemblance between the relevant countable model and
higher-order properties.
3.1 Inner model richness
Extensions of V are useful for postulating the existence of many inner models. The
Inner Model Hypothesis does exactly this, using extensions of a model M in order to
make claims about the inner models ofM:
Definition 4. (Informal23) [Friedman, 2006] M (a model of ZFC) satisfies the M-
Inner Model Hypothesis (henceforth ‘M-IMH’) iff whenever φ is a parameter-free first
order sentence that holds in an inner model IM
∗
of an outer modelM∗ ofM, there is
an inner model IM ofM that also satisfies φ. The Inner Model Hypothesis (henceforth
‘IMH’) is the V -Inner Model Hypothesis.
Remark 5. As we shall see (and this is one of the foci of this paper) the content of
this claim depends on the interpretation we give to the notion of ‘outer model of
V ’ and ‘inner model of V ’. Later, we will show that admitting certain impredica-
tive resources facilitates the coding of the IMH, thus for now we leave it informally
formulated. The reader experiencing metaphysical queasiness can, for the moment,
think about theM-IMH as formulated about an arbitrary countable transitive model
M of ZFC.
The M-IMH thus states that M has many inner models, in the sense that any
sentence φ true in an inner model of an outer model ofM is already true in an inner
model of M. In this way, M has been maximised with respect to internal consistency
(see Figure 1 for visual representation of an application of theM-IMH).
There are a number of reasons to find theM-IMH interesting, not least because it
maximises the satisfaction of consistent sentences within structures internal to some
M. If we could formulate the IMH as about V , it is thus foundationally signifi-
cant: The IMH gives us an inner model for any sentence model-theoretically com-
patible with the initial structure of V , and thus serves to ensure the existence of
well-founded, proper-class-sized structures in which we can do mathematics. It also
has a similarity to Absolute-MA; the IMH is just more general in that it permits the
23We will show how to code this axiom formally in §§4–6.
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Figure 1: A visual representation of an application of theM-IMH
M∗ M∗IM
∗
IM
∗
φ φ
M MIM IM
consideration of arbitrary extensions instead of merely set forcing extensions. The
M-IMH also has substantial large cardinal strength; it implies the existence of inner
models (of M) with measurable cardinals of arbitrarily large Mitchell order, and is
consistent relative to the existence of a Woodin cardinal with an inaccessible above.24
However, it is also interesting in that it has various anti-large cardinal properties, the
M-IMH implies that there are no inaccessibles inM.25
Whence the problem then for the Universist? If the Universist wishes to use the
IMH as a new axiom about V , she has to examine issues concerning extensions of V .
If they ascribe no meaning to claims concerning extensions, then the IMH is utterly
trivial. Under this analysis, everything true in an inner model of an outer model of
V is also true in an inner model of V , as either (i) the outer model is proper, does not
exist, and hence nothing is true in an inner model of that proper outer model of V , or
(ii) the outer model is V itself, and obviously anything true in an inner model of V is
true in an inner model of V . Thus, if the Universist ascribes no meaning to the term
‘outer model of V ’ the inner model hypothesis fails to capture what it was designed
to state (i.e. a richness of inner models).
However, even supposing that the Universist allows some interpretation of exten-
sion talk, the content that the IMH has is going to vary according to the resources one
allows. We begin by making the following definitions:
Definition 6. (NBG) Let (V , CV ) denote the structure (satisfying NBG) composed
of V with all its classes26. The Set-Generic Inner Model Hypothesis is the claim that
if a (first-order, parameter free) sentence φ holds in an inner model of a set forcing
extension (V [G], CV [G]) of (V , CV ) (where V [G] consists of the interpretations of set-
24See [Friedman et al., 2008] for details.
25See [Friedman, 2006], p. 597 for details.
26We discuss how to interpret classes over V later; see §5.2.
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names in V using G, and CV [G] consists of the interpretations of class-names in CV
using G), then φ holds in an inner model of V . If we insist that CV consists only
of V -definable classes, and that the inner models of V and V [G] are definable with
set parameters, then we shall call this principle the Definable Set-Generic Inner Model
Hypothesis.
Definition 7. (NBG) Again, let (V , CV ) be the NBG structure consisting of V with
all its classes. The Class-Generic Inner Model Hypothesis is the claim that if a (first-
order, parameter free) sentence φ holds in an inner model of a tame class forcing
extension (V [G], CV [G]) of (V , CV ) (where V [G] and CV [G] are defined as above),
then φ holds in an inner model of V .
Remark 8. Before we begin teasing apart the two possible axioms, we make the fol-
lowing observation regarding the expressibility of these principles.27 The Definable
Set-Generic Inner Model Hypothesis is expressible in V as a scheme of assertions
in first-order ZFC, since we can first-order quantify over set forcings, and talk de-
finably about their forcing relations, and using these forcing relations speak about
definable inner models of the set-forcing extensions. For the full Set-Generic and
Class-Generic Inner Model Hypotheses, we need to use class theory; in the first case
to quantify over inner models (that may not be definable), and in the second case to
quantify over the forcings in question. Note that for class forcings, one can make the
inner model of the outer model definable using Jensen coding, and so the assump-
tion on the definability of the inner models of V and V [G]would result in equivalent
principles. Later (in the omniscience subsection of §6), we will see that given some
(non-first order) conditions on the universe, the full IMH can be expressible inNBG.
In any case, the results of §6 will show that a variant of MK (in fact a variant of
NBG+Σ11-Comprehension) also suffices to formulate all versions of the IMH. For
the time being then, we will restrict to the versions of the IMH that we can express
in NBG, i.e. the Set-Generic Inner Model Hypothesis and the Class-Generic Inner
Model Hypothesis.
We then have the following simple fact for the Set-Generic Inner Model Hypoth-
esis:
Theorem 9. (NBG) If the Set-Generic Inner Model Hypothesis holds then V 6= L.
Proof. Assume V = L and the Set-Generic Inner Model Hypothesis. Then there is
an inner model of an outer model in which V = L is false (the addition of a single
Cohen real x over L to L[x] will suffice, with the relevant inner model simply being
the forcing extension L[x]). By the Generic Inner Model Hypothesis there is an inner
model of L in which V 6= L. But L is the smallest inner model, and so V = L and
V 6= L, ⊥.
However, though this restricted version of the IMH is sufficient to get us a certain
richness of inner models (enough to break V = L) we get more if we allow class
forcings. This is brought out in the following:
Theorem 10. (NBG) Assuming the consistency of the existence of a Vκ elementary
in V , there is amodel satisfying the Set-Generic InnerModel Hypothesis that violates
the Class-Generic Inner Model Hypothesis.
Proof. Take a model M of V = L containing a VMκ = L
M
κ ≺ V
M = LM. We work
from the perspective of M. For any particular β, let Col(ω,β) be the Le´vy collapse
27We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting that we examine this question.
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of β to ω, and let G be generic for Col(ω,κ). We claim that (L[G],DefL[G]) satisfies
the Set-Generic Inner Model Hypothesis. It suffices to show that if a sentence holds
after forcing with Col(ω,λ) for some λ, then this λ can be chosen to be less than κ.
This is because any set-forcing can be absorbed into Col(ω,λ) for some λ,28 and any
two Col(ω,λ)-generic extensions satisfy the same sentences.
Now if φ holds after forcing with Col(ω,λ) for some λ, then as Lκ is elementary
in L, φ also holds after forcing over Lκ with Col(ω,λ′) for some λ′ < κ. But ifG(λ′) is
generic over Lκ for Col(ω,λ′), then Lκ[G(λ′)] is elementary in L[G(λ′)] as Col(ω,λ′)
is a forcing of size less than κ, using the fact that κ is a cardinal of L. So φ holds after
forcing with Col(ω,λ′) for some λ′ < κ, as desired.
However, (L[G],DefL[G]) does not satisfy the Class-Generic Inner Model Hy-
pothesis because every real in L[G] is set-generic over L, and by Jensen coding any
model of the Class-Generic Inner Model Hypothesis must have reals which are not
set-generic over L.
Thus, we see how inner model hypotheses are dependent for their content and
implications upon what we allow as extensions. Indeed, the difference between set
forcing and class forcing is brought out by the following:
Definition 11. (ZFC) We say that a model M = (M ,∈) κ-globally covers V if for
every function f (in V ) with dom(f) ∈M and rng(f) ⊆M , there is a function g ∈M
such that for all i ∈ dom(f), f(i) ∈ g(i) andM |= |g(i)| < κ.
Theorem 12. (ZFC) [Bukovsky´, 1973] Let V be a transitive model of ZFC, andM an
inner model of V definable in V , and κ a regular uncountable cardinal inM. ThenM
κ-globally covers V if and only if V is a κ-c.c. set-generic extension ofM.29
The theorem highlights that being a set-forcing extension is a relatively restricted
kind of extending construction in comparison to others: If one model is a set forcing
extension of another (by some κ-c.c. forcing), then every function in the extension
is already κ-covered by some function in the ground model. There is no such re-
quirement for class forcing. For example, consider an x ⊆ κ that is κ-Cohen generic
over V , and let f be the increasing enumeration of x. Then, f is not κ-covered by a
function in V . Thus, the class forcing that adds a single κ-Cohen at every regular κ vi-
olates global κ-covering at every κ. The question of whether or not there could be an
analogue of Bukovsky´’s Theorem for class forcing is currently unresolved, however
any such result would have to transcend the notion of κ-global covering.
Suppose then that we do wish to assert that the IMH is true of V for arbitrary
extensions. Then we need to give meaning (in whatever appropriate codification)
to the claim that V has various kinds of extension. The intra-V (i.e. internal to
V ) consequences provable from the IMH may then vary depending on the kinds of
extension we can interpret.
How does this play out with respect to the countable transitive model strategy?
Here, there is a prima facie limitation. As it stands, a V elementarily equivalent to
V is only accurate for first-order statements about V . Because of the inherent incom-
pleteness in second-order properties over V , there is no guarantee that V perfectly
mirrors V ’s higher-order properties. This difficulty is especially interesting given
that a large part of set theory comprises examining the structural relationships be-
tween models. Simply because an axiom is not first-order is not a reason (without
significant further argument) to establish that it is not of independent interest.
28See here [Cummings, 2010] (§14) for technical explanation, and [Barton, 2018] for further philosophi-
cal remarks. We thank Monroe Eskew for helpful discussion here.
29For further discussion of this theorem, see [Friedman et al., F].
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The situation can be brought into sharper focus by initially considering the be-
haviour of arbitrary higher-order properties. Letting CM denote a collection of classes
for a model M (i.e. to serve as interpretation of the second-order variables), and
(M ,∈, CM) be the resulting model of second-order set theory, then it is clear that we
can have a V elementarily equivalent to V for parameter-free first-order truth, but
diverging in the higher-order realm. To see this, consider the following set-sized
case. Let some universe V be of the form (Vκ,∈,Vκ+1), where κ is inaccessible. Now
use AC to obtain a countable elementary (in the language of MK) submodel, and
collapse to obtain some countable and transitive U = (U ,∈, CU) (note here that both
U and CU are countable). Letting Def(M) denote the set of classes of a model M
definable with first-order parameters, we then have that (U ,∈, CU) and (Vκ,∈,Vκ+1)
satisfy MK class theory, whereas (U ,∈,Def(U)) and (Vκ,∈,Def(Vκ)) each satisfy
the weaker NBG class theory, despite all four models having the same first-order
theory. This shows that though we might have a V elementary equivalent to V for
first-order truth, it may radically diverge from V in its higher-order properties, pos-
sibly even (dependent on the class theory we accept for V , and the classes we choose
for V) having ‘more’ classes (in the sense of sentences of class theory satisfied) than
V .
While we see that V need not resemble V with respect to arbitrary higher-order
truth, there is the question of whether or not it need resemble V with respect to the
higher-order truth relevant for satisfaction of the IMH. We will show how to code
outer models of V later, in order give meaning to this question concerning the IMH.
However, even in the case of countable transitive models, the question does not have
an obvious answer:
Question 13. Could there be a countable transitive modelM = (M ,∈,CM) ofNBG,
such that M has a countable (from the perspective of M) transitive submodel M′ =
(M ′,∈,CM
′
), also a model of NBG, with M and M′ agreeing on parameter-free
first-order truth in ZFC but disagreeing on the IMH?
Themathematics surrounding this question seems difficult, yielding a potentially
philosophically and mathematically interesting line of inquiry. For now, we merely
point out that it is at least an open (epistemic) possibility that a V equivalent to V
for first-order truth might fail to resemble V with respect to the IMHwhen we admit
some conception of classes for each (assuming that the IMH can be given a reason-
able interpretation over V ). Later, we will see that if we allow impredicative class
comprehension, this difficulty can be circumvented. A small amount of impredica-
tive similarity between V and V is sufficient to yield enough resemblance for the
satisfaction of the IMH to covary between V and V.
3.2 ♯-generation
Interestingly, width extensions (i.e. universes containing the same ordinals but more
subsets) allow us to encapsulatemany large cardinal consequences of reflection prop-
erties. It is here that the notion of a sharp becomes useful. Before we give the def-
inition, we will require a notion of iteration in class theory. We therefore need a
preliminary:
Definition 14. (NBG) Let ETR (for ‘Elementary Transfinite Recursion’) be the state-
ment that every first-order recursive definition along any well-founded binary class
relation has a solution.30
30For discussions of ETR, see [Fujimoto, 2012] and [Gitman and Hamkins, 2017].
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Figure 2: A visual representation of the initial ultrapowers corresponding to a sharp
(N ,U)
N = (N ,U)
·U
κ•
(N1,U1)
•
·U1
κ1
π0,1
π0,1
π1,2
π1,2
• • •
We make the following definition (and provide a visual representation in Figure
2):
Definition 15. (NBG + ETR) A transitive structure N = (N ,U) is called a class-
iterable sharp with critical point κ or just a class-iterable sharp iff31:
(i) N is a transitive model of ZFC− (i.e. ZFC with the power set axiom removed)
in which κ is the largest cardinal and is strongly inaccessible.
(ii) (N ,U) is amenable (i.e. x ∩ U ∈ N for any x ∈ N ).
(iii) U is a normal measure on κ in (N ,U).
(iv) N is iterable in the sense that all successive ultrapower iterations along class
well-orders (over the ambient model containing the sharp) starting with (N ,U)
are well-founded, providing a sequence of structures (Ni,Ui) (for i a set or class
well-order) and corresponding Σ1-elementary iteration maps πi,j : Ni −→ Nj
where (N ,U) = (N0,U0).
Remark 16. The original work of [Friedman, 2016] and [Friedman and Honzik, 2016b]
defined sharps in terms of ‘all’ successive ultrapowers beingwell-founded in a height
potentialist framework (i.e. where any universe can be extended in height). Since
we are shooting for axioms on the Universist framework, we will allow the itera-
tion of the ultrapower along any class well-order, and hence make the definitions
in NBG + ETR. In any case, we will see later (§6), ETR can be eliminated in the
presence of some impredicative class theory.
Using the existence of the maps πi,j : Ni −→ Nj , we can then provide the follow-
ing definition:
Definition 17. (NBG + ETR) A transitive model M = (M ,∈) is class iterably sharp
generated iff there is a class-iterable sharp (N ,U) and an iterationN0 −→ N1 −→ N2...
such thatM =
⋃
β∈OnM V
Nβ
κβ .
31This way of defining sharps is modified from the discussion in [Friedman, 2016] and
[Friedman and Honzik, 2016b].
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In other words, a model is class iterably sharp generated iff it arises through
collecting together the V Niκi (i.e. each level indexed by the largest cardinal of the
model with index i) resulting from the iteration of a class-iterable sharp through
the ordinal height of M. Note than in producing the model, we only require that
the sharp is iterated OrdM-many times, despite the fact that it can be iterated far
further.32
Amodel’s being class iterably sharp generated engenders some pleasant features.
In particular, it implies that any satisfaction (possibly with parameters drawn from
M) obtainable in height extensions of M adding ordinals (through the well-orders
in the class theory of the ambient universe) is already reflected to an initial segment
of M.33 In this way, we are able to coalesce many reflection principles into a single
property of a model. For example a modelM being class iterably sharp generated al-
ready entails reflection fromM to initial segments of nth-order logic for any n.34 One
might then suggest the following kind of axiom in attempting to capture reflection
properties:
Axiom 18. (Informal)35 The Class Iterable Sharp Axiom. V is class iterably sharp gen-
erated.
which would allow us to assert in one fell swoop that V satisfies many reflection
axioms (rather than having to assert them in a piecemeal fashion). However, such
an axiom is also clearly problematic from the Universist perspective; claiming that
V is class iterably sharp generated depends upon the existence of an iterable class
sharp for V , which cannot be in V . If it were, one could obtain a class club resulting
from iterating the sharp (namely the class of κi), which in turn forms a club of regular
V -cardinals. The ωth element of any club of ordinals with proper initial segments in
V must be singular with cofinality ω, and so we would obtain a contradiction at κω;
it would have to be both regular and singular.
Thus, the claim that V is class iterably sharp generated comes out as trivially
false; there simply is no such sharp. Moreover, sharps are especially problematic
as they cannot be reached by known forcing constructions, so many of our usual
simulations of satisfaction for extensions (such as the use of a forcing relation or
Boolean-valuedmodel) will not help in their discussion.36 Moreover, whilst the first-
order consequences of V being class iterably sharp generated will be mirrored in V ,
there is not yet any interpretation of the embeddings yielding the sharp (these being
higher-order objects). As we’ll see in §§4,5, and 6, we can develop an interpretation
of these objects. For now, we look at some other possible uses of extensions.
3.3 Set-theoretic geology
A final kind of higher-order axiom that uses extensions emerges from set-theoretic
geology.37 The study of the geological properties of a model concerns how different
models could have arisen by some variety of extension construction (the metaphor
of geology indicates tunnelling down into the ground models of a particular starting
32Elsewhere the third author argued that any maximal reflection principle will require a formulation
external to the model in which it is witnessed, since one can always strengthen any internal reflection
principle Φ with the statement Φ+“There exists an α such that Vα |= Φ”. See [Friedman, 2016], §4.4.
33See [Friedman, 2016] and [Friedman and Honzik, 2016b] for discussion.
34See here [Friedman and Honzik, 2016b] and [Friedman, 2016].
35We will show how to code this axiom formally in §§4–6.
36See [Friedman, 2000], §5.2 for details.
37See [Fuchs et al., 2015] for a description of set-theoretic geology.
15
model). In the original paper of [Fuchs et al., 2015], the authors are almost exclu-
sively concerned with set-generic forcing extensions. We might examine, however,
how this can be extended to arbitrary extensions. We now repeat some definitions of
[Fuchs et al., 2015] to show how this can be done:
Definition 19. (ZFC) [Fuchs et al., 2015] A classW is a ground of V iff V is obtained
by set forcing overW , that is if there is some P ∈ W andW -P-generic filter such that
V =W [G].
Definition 20. (ZFC) [Fuchs et al., 2015] A classW is a bedrock for V iff it is a ground
of V and minimal with respect to the forcing-extension relation.
Definition 21. (ZFC) [Fuchs et al., 2015] The mantle M of a model of set theory is
the intersection of all its grounds.
[Fuchs et al., 2015] then goes on to prove several facts about the geological prop-
erties models may possess. In particular, the paper shows that many of these state-
ments, which appear second-order (given their reference to structural interrelations
of proper class models) can actually be rendered in first-order terms. For example
they discuss the following:
Theorem 22. (ZFC) [Laver, 2007] (The Ground Model Definability Theorem). Every
ground modelW of V is definable in V using a parameter fromW . Moreover, there
is a specific formula φ(y,x) such that if W is a ground of V , then there exists an
r ∈W such that:
W = {x|φ(r,x)}.
This theorem facilitates the study of the geological structure of set-generic multi-
verses from within a given model in first-order terms. However, we might consider
generalisations of the idea of geology to other extensions. [Fuchs et al., 2015] goes
some way towards this, considering the structure present when we allow pseudo-
grounds into the picture: models that have certain covering and approximation prop-
erties that facilitate the definability of the ground model in the (possibly class) forc-
ing extension.
Despite this, ground-model definability theorem can fail badly when we fully
admit class forcing extensions into the picture, as shown by the following:
Theorem 23. (MK) [Antos, 2018] There is a ZFC-preserving class forcing such that
the ground modelM is not definable in the extension M[G].
The theorem shows that for many class forcings, the definability of the ground
model in the extension can fail. Thus, by insisting that we examine any geological
structure in only cases where we do have definability, we lose a possible route for dis-
covering facts about V . Moreover, insisting on the use of set forcing obscures other
possible routes of inquiry. For example, instead of looking at forcing extensions, one
could examine arbitrary extensions which preserve cardinals. This is a deep and
challenging form of set-theoretic geology. Or, one can look at inner models obtained
by iterating the HOD-operation (i.e. looking at the HOD of the HOD, the HOD of
the HOD of the HOD etc.).
How might the use of geology be useful in formulating axioms for V ? A natural
thought for a Universist is that V cannot be ‘reached’ by particular kinds of con-
struction. In the case of the set-generic multiverse, we might then postulate that the
following is true:
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Definition 24. (ZFC) [Fuchs et al., 2015] V satisfies the ground axiom iff it is not a
non-trivial set-forcing extension of an inner model.
In the present case, we might consider the following sort of axiom:
Definition 25. (Informal) V satisfies the Φ-ground axiom iff for extensions of kind Φ
(e.g. set forcing, class forcing, appropriate arbitrary extensions), V is not a non-trivial
extension of kind Φ of an inner model.
Axioms of this form would provide an formalisation of the idea that V is ‘un-
reachable’ in some sense: it cannot be obtained from an inner model by certain kinds
of extension. As it stands, we do not need to talk about extensions in order to talk
about the geological structure of V ; most of the discussion here concerns how V can
be obtained by extending inner models. However, often geological structure is elu-
cidated by considering how particular grounds (possibly satisfying some Φ-ground
axiom) behave within a wider multiverse context. A salient concept here is the fol-
lowing:
Definition 26. (ZFC) [Fuchs et al., 2015] The set-generic mantle is the intersection of
all the grounds of set forcing extensions of V .38
In the case of set forcing, this class will be definable, owing to the Laver defin-
ability of the ground model of an extension. In fact, by recent results of Usuba39,
the mantle (the intersection of all grounds of V ) and set-generic mantle coincide.
However, the loosening of the requirement on set forcing in the definition of the
mantle (say to cardinal preserving arbitrary extensions), and the use of this (possibly
non-definable) higher-order entity in postulating an axiom to hold of V (for example
that the ‘arbitrary’ mantle is a proper subclass of V ), requires some interpretation of
arbitrary outer models of V .
4 The syntactic coding of extensions using V -logic
We thus find ourselves in a tricky situation. We wish to see if we can use extension
talk to make claims about V , but are at a loss how to do this for certain axioms re-
lating to higher-order properties of V . In the rest of the paper, we provide a new
method for a Universist to interpret extensions of V , and argue that it is philosophi-
cally virtuous. First, we provide a sketch of the proposal.
The central idea will be to use an infinitary proof system (V -logic) to code satis-
faction in extensions of V syntactically. This has already beenmentioned in [Antos et al., 2015]
and [Friedman, 2016], but we provide three important additional contributions. First
(§4) we provide a full and detailed technical account of the mechanisms of V -logic,
which has not yet appeared. Second (§5) we will show how V -logic relates to im-
predicative class theories, in particular showing how certainmodifications of V -logic
facilitate a coding in class theory with some impredicative comprehension. In par-
ticular, we show how it is possible, given an impredicative class theory, to code con-
sistency in V -logic by a single class. While we’ll argue that this some meaning to the
notion of outer model for V (and hence we can provide some interpretation of the
axioms we have mentioned) we will also point out that more is needed to satisfy the
Methodological Constraint. For our third contribution, we then (§6) discuss methods
38By the results of [Fuchs et al., 2015], this is parametrically definable in the extension.
39Namely his proof of the Downward Directed Grounds Hypothesis (that any two grounds have a com-
mon ground) and the Set-Downward Directed Grounds Hypothesis (that a set-sized parameterised family of
grounds have a common ground). See [Usuba, 2017] for details.
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for remedying this defect by finding appropriate countable transitive models. For
example, we can introduce a predicate for this class and use the resulting theory to
reduce our claims to the countable, providing an interpretation that links truth in V
to our naive thinking concerning extensions, much as the earlier discussed countable
transitive model strategy did for first-order truth. Separately, we will also consider
second-order conditions that V might satisfy which yield a first-order definition of
satisfaction in arbitrary outer models.
4.1 Exposition of V -logic
That infinitary logics relate to talk concerning extensions was known since [Barwise, 1975],
and utilised by [Antos et al., 2015] in providing an interpretation of extension talk in
a framework where any universe could be extended to another with more ordinals.
We provide a more technically detailed exposition of the system of V -logic than has
been hitherto provided, and show how it can be captured using impredicative class
theories, facilitating a possible line of response on behalf of the Universist. Since we
will be showing how to code the logic later, we will leave the theory in which the
definitions are formulated for §§5–6.
We first set up the language:
Definition 27. L V∈ is the language consisting of ZFC with the following symbols
added:
(i) A predicate V¯ to denote V .
(ii) A constant x¯ for every x ∈ V .
We can then define V -logic:
Definition 28. V -logic is a system in L V∈ , with provability relation ⊢V (defined be-
low) that consists of the following axioms:
(i) x¯ ∈ V¯ for every x ∈ V .
(ii) Every atomic or negated atomic sentence of L∈ ∪ {x¯|x ∈ V } true in V is an
axiom of V -logic.
(iii) The usual axioms of first-order logic40 in L V∈ .
For sentences in L V∈ , V -logic contains the following rules of inference:
(a) Modus ponens: From φ and φ→ ψ infer ψ.
(b) The Set-rule: For a, b ∈ V , from φ(b¯) for all b ∈ a infer ∀x ∈ a¯φ(x).
(c) The V -rule: From φ(b¯) for all b ∈ V , infer ∀x ∈ V¯ φ(x).
Proof codes in V -logic are thus (possibly infinite) well-founded trees with root
the conclusion of the proof. Whenever there is an application of the V -rule, we get
proper-class-many branches extending from a single node. More formally, we define
the notion of a proof code in V -logic (an example of which is visually represented in
Figure 3) as follows:
40See, for example, [Enderton, 1972], p. 112.
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Definition 29. A proof code of χ in V -logic is a (possibly infinite) well-founded tree,
with root the conclusion of the proof (i.e. χ) and where previous nodes are either
codes of axioms of V -logic or follow from one of its inference rules. Since we will be
proving facts about codes of these proofs later, we provide the following inductive
definition:
(A) Base cases:
(i) For every x ∈ V , the tree that has as its domain the code of x¯ ∈ V¯ and as
its relation ∅ is a proof in V -logic.
(ii) For every atomic or negated atomic sentence φ of L∈∪{x¯|x ∈ V } true in V ,
the tree that has as its domain the code of φ and as its relation ∅ is a proof
in V -logic.
(iii) The trees that have as their domains a single axiom of first-order logic in
L V∈ and as their relations the empty relation are all proofs in V -logic.
(iv) If we are proving from some set of premises T, each tree with domain a
single sentence of T and empty relation is a proof in V -logic.
(B) Inductive steps:
(i) If Tφ and Tφ→χ are proofs in V -logic, then the tree obtained by joining the
code of χ as the root to the two trees Tφ and Tφ→χ is a proof in V -logic.
(ii) If a is a set, and we have a non-empty set of proof trees of the form Tφ(b¯)
coding proofs of φ(b¯) for all b ∈ a, then the tree that has as a root the code
of ∀x ∈ a¯φ(x), and all Tφ(b¯) extending from that node is also a proof in
V -logic.
(iii) If we have a non-empty class of proof trees of the form Tφ(b¯) coding proofs
of φ(b¯) for all b ∈ V , then the tree that has as a root the code of ∀x ∈ V¯ φ(x)
and all Tφ(b¯) extending from that node is also a proof in V -logic.
Definition 30. For a theoryT and sentence φ in the language of V -logic, we say that
T ⊢V φ iff there is a proof code of φ in V -logic fromT. We furthermore say that a set
of sentences T is consistent in V -logic iff T ⊢V φ ∧ ¬φ is false for all formulas of L V∈ .
Remark 31. We discuss how these proof codes relate to admissible sets (defined in
§5) and can be coded in the class theory later (§5). The eagle-eyed reader may notice
that we do not require that there is only one proof of φ(b¯) for every b ∈ V at a particu-
lar level of the tree, but that proofs can be repeated for some b. This differs from pre-
vious presentations of V -logic41 (or M-logic in the terminology of [Barwise, 1975]),
and will be essential for some interactions between Hyp(V ) and the class-theoretic
coding (we define and codeHyp(V ) below; one can think of it as a class givingmean-
ing to the term “the least admissible containing V as an element”). There we are not
guaranteed the existence of a well-ordering of Hyp(V ) and thus cannot a priori pick
‘least’ proof codes. We regard it as a benign feature of our modified definition of
V -logic proof codes that they can be applied to more structures without problem.
Definition 32. We furthermore say that a set of sentencesT is consistent in V -logic iff
T ⊢V φ ∧ ¬φ is false for all formulas of L V∈ .
With the mechanisms of V -logic set up, we now describe how its use is relevant
for interpreting extensions of universes.
41See, for example, [Antos et al., 2015].
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Figure 3: Visual representation of a proof of χ in V -logic
For every y ∈ a...ψ(y¯2)ψ(y¯1)ψ(y¯0)
∀y ∈ a¯ ψ(y)∀y ∈ a¯ ψ(y) → (∀xφ(x)→ χ)for every x ∈ V...φ(x¯2)φ(x¯1)φ(x¯0)
∀xφ(x)→ χ∀xφ(x)
χ
An application of the V -rule
An application of the Set-rule over a
4.2 Interpreting extensions in V -logic
We have provided explanation of a logic that rigidifies the structure of V ; adding
constants and axioms to fix V ’s properties within the syntax of V -logic. How might
this allow us to interpret satisfaction in outer models of V ? As we shall argue, con-
sistency in V -logic of theories in L V∈ serves that purpose.
42 For the moment, we will
work with V -logic as a system in its own right, and show how it can be coded in a
manner acceptable to the Universist in §5.
We first introduce a constant W¯ to our language. Letting Φ be a condition in any
particular formal language on universes we wish to simulate in an extension, we
then introduce the following ‘axioms’ into our theory of V -logic:
(i) W¯ -Width Axiom. W¯ is a universe satisfying ZFC with the same ordinals as V¯
and containing V¯ as a proper subclass.
(ii) W¯ -Φ-Width Axiom. W¯ is such that Φ.
We can then have the following axiom to give meaning to the notion of an exten-
sion such that Φ, and hence yield intra-V consequences of said extension:
Φ⊢V -Axiom. The theory in V -logic with the W¯ -Width Axiom and W¯ -Φ-
Width Axiom is consistent under ⊢V .43
We can use this axiom to give meaning to the notion of an intra-V consequence
of the axiom mentioning extensions. Any syntactic consequence concerning either
some x¯ or V¯ derived from the axiomsmentioning W¯ will hold of the respective actual
structures: we simply trace the consequences to the relevant constant.
To see this in concrete contexts, let us examine V -logic in action with respect
to some of the examples outlined earlier (we’ll show how to code V -logic in §5, but
proceed intuitively for now). In the case of a set forcing we could have the following:
Definition 33. W¯ -G-Width Axiom. W¯ is such that it contains some V¯ -P¯-generic G.
42This idea is also discussed (but only for set-sized models) in [Antos et al., 2015], [Friedman, 2016],
and [Barton and Friedman, 2017]. In this paper, we expand these results current Universist purposes, and
show how to interpret V -logic in class theory.
43Strictly speaking, this will involve a new consequence relation ⊢′
V
, that includes mention of any
axioms involving W¯ . In fact, any collection of additional axioms will result in a new consequence relation
involving those axioms. The consequence relation is simply ⊢V but with any additional axioms added to
our original definition of V -logic. For clarity we suppress this detail, continue to use ⊢V (thereby mildly
abusing notation), and show how these relations can be coded formally later.
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If the resulting V -logic theory is consistent, then any syntactic consequence of the
existence of W¯ concerning V¯ will then be true in V .
The situation with class forcing is similar, but with a small twist. For, in the case
of class forcing using some class poset PC , the existence of a V -PC generic GC is
not a first-order property of W¯ . Despite this, in V -logic we have the ability to add
predicates (as we did with V¯ and W¯ ). Thus, we can add additional predicates P¯C
and G¯C for PC and GC into the usual syntax of V -logic, and state the following
axiom:
Definition 34. W¯ -GC -Width Axiom. W¯ is such that G¯C ⊆ W¯ and G¯C is P¯C -generic
over V .
and then examine whether the resulting theory is consistent in V -logic. Any intra-V
consequence of such a (consistent) theory would, for exactly the same reasons as in
the case of set forcing, naturally transfer to truths concerning V .
This liberation ofmethods via syntactic means also allows us to formulate axioms
that capture non-forcing extensions. For example:
Definition 35. W¯ -Class-♯-Width Axiom. W¯ has the same ordinals as V¯ , satisfiesNBG+
ETR, and contains a class sharp that generates V .
This then allows us to express the claim that V is sharp generated:
Definition 36. The Class Iterable Sharp Axiom⊢V . The theory in V -logic with the W¯ -
Width Axiom and W¯ -Class-♯-Width Axiom is consistent under ⊢V .
Again, anything provable about V using this theory will be represented by the
relevant constants in the theory of V -logic, allowing us to give meaning to the claim
that V is class iterably sharp generated. Later (§6) we will see that this corresponds
in a neat way to the actual existence of sharps over certain (countable) models of set
theory.
We noted earlier (§2) that much extension talk could be interpreted by conduct-
ing the construction over a countable transitive model V that satisfied exactly the
same parameter-free first-order sentences as V . It was noted there, however, that the
production of such a model provided no guarantee that the model would respect
greater than first-order features of V , in particular the density of inner models pro-
vided by the IMH. The key fact here is that now we have the notion of interpreting
extensions via consistency in V -logic, we are able to simulate statements about the
existence of arbitrarymodels and their interrelations.
Again, we add a constant W¯ to our language and formulate axioms concerning
width extensions represented syntactically by the relevant W¯ . We can then express
the intended content of the IMH as follows:
Definition 37. IMH⊢V . Suppose that φ is a parameter-free first-order sentence. LetT
be a V -logic theory containing the W¯ -Width Axiom and also the W¯ -φ-Width Axiom
(i.e. W¯ satisfies φ). Then if T is consistent under ⊢V , there is an inner model of V
satisfying φ.
Thus, by interpreting the existence of outer models through the consistency of
theories, we can now make claims concerning consequences (about V ) of the exis-
tence of outer models. In particular, we can say that if φ is satisfiable in an extension
of V (syntactically formulated as W¯ ) then it is satisfied in an inner model of V . So,
the IMH⊢V holds iff whenever the mathematical structure of V does not preclude the
21
V -logic consistency of an outer model satisfying φ, there is an inner model of V sat-
isfying φ. In this way, we make claims concerning greater than first-order properties
of V needed to express the IMH in its maximal sense.
Moreover, we can use this to talk about V ’s place within a set-theoretically geo-
logical structure. Satisfaction in the relevant kinds of extension can be formulated
as the consistency of some particular V -logic theory or theories, and V ’s geological
properties thereby studied. Thus V -logic also allows us to talk about V within a
higher-order multiverse structure. In fact:
Remark 38. We can even interpret satisfaction in non-well-founded extensions of V ,
simply by adding an axiom that states that the extension is non-well-founded and
includes V as a standard part.
Thus, if we allow the use of V -logic, we are able to syntactically code satisfaction
in arbitrary extensions of V in which V appears standard, and hence the effects of
extensions of V on V .
There are two slight wrinkles here, however. First, while we have defined the
system, we have yet to show that it can be formulated in a theory acceptable to the
Universist. Second, while we have ‘given meaning’ to the idea of an outer model
via the use of V -logic, we have yet to show that it actually does the job we want it
to; namely mimicking the existence of extensions. These issues can be brought into
sharper focus by contrasting our current situation with the use of forcing relations in
interpreting set forcing, possibly in conjunction with a countable transitive elemen-
tary submodel V of V . There, we know (1) We have the resources in V to talk about
the relevant forcing relations (via the use of the forcing language), and (2) Whenever
V has an extension by some P-V-generic G to V[G] |= φ, there will be a correspond-
ing partial order P′ in V , forcing relation P′ , and p ∈ P′ such that p P′ φ. In this
way, the forcing relation is certified as an acceptable interpretation of forcing over V ;
as it is mirrored in the countable (in line with the Methodological Constraint). In the
next two sections we will show that, given an impredicative class theory, we can be
in a similar position but with arbitrary extensions (and thus adequately formalise the
axioms discussed in §3).
5 V -logic, admissibility, and class theory
We are now in a position where we have provided a logical system (V -logic) that
allows us to interpret the axioms we discussed earlier. However, it remains to show
that the Universist can legitimately utilise this philosophical system. We proceed as
follows: First, we show how we can code a particular height extension of V (namely
Hyp(V )) using impredicative class theory. Of course such a height extension does
not really exist for the Universist, rather we are simply talking about what structures
can be coded in impredicative class theory. Next, we’ll show how our version of V -
logic can be represented within this structure. We’ll then point out the moral of this
story: V -logic can be coded using class theory.
5.1 Admissibility
First, we need to explain the structure we will be coding. We first recall the system
of Kripke-Platek set theoryKP :
Definition 39. Kripke-Platek Set Theory (or simply ‘KP ’) comprises the following ax-
ioms:
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(i) Extensionality
(ii) Union
(iii) Pairing
(iv) Foundation
(v) ∆0-Separation: If φ is a∆0 formula in which b does not occur free, then:
(∀a)(∃b)(∀x)[x ∈ b↔ (x ∈ a ∧ φ(x))]
(vi) ∆0-Collection: If φ is a∆0 formula in which b does not occur free:
(∀a)[(∀x ∈ a)(∃y)φ(x, y) → (∃b)(∀x ∈ a)(∃y ∈ b)φ(x, y)]
We make a further pair of definitions:
Definition 40. A setN is admissible overM iffN is a transitive model ofKP contain-
ingM as an element.
Definition 41. Hyp(M) is the smallest (transitive) x such that x is admissible over
M.
Our interest will be in Hyp(V ); the least admissible structure containing V as an
element. Of course this structure does not really exist. However, we will show that
something isomorphic to Hyp(V ) can be coded in an impredicative class theory.
5.2 Class theory
We now provide a short explanation of the impredicative class theory that we will
be using (a variant of MK). Later, we will show that full MK (with a certain extra
axiom on the existence of isomorphisms) is far more than is required. While a philo-
sophical and mathematical analysis of greater than first-order set theory is merited,
considerations of space prevent a full examination. A couple of remarks, however,
are in order regarding Universism and impredicative class theory.
There are several options available for the Universist in interpreting proper class
discourse over V . While one method is to simply regard class talk as shorthand
for the satisfaction of a first-order formula (a method which yields no impredica-
tive comprehension), this is not the only possibility. We might, for example, in-
terpret the class quantifiers nominalistically through the use of plural resources (as
in [Boolos, 1984] and [Uzquiano, 2003]). Another approach is to interpret classes
through some variety of property theory (as in [Linnebo, 2006] or, with a little mas-
saging to the set-theoretic context [Hale, 2013]). Still further, we might interpret the
class quantifiers using mereology (as in [Welch and Horsten, 2016]).
Key to each is that there is at least the possibility for motivating some impred-
icative class comprehension. For example, plural interpretation has been seen, on
the assumption that plural quantification over V is determinate, to motivate full im-
predicative comprehension for classes.44 Many views of property theory suggest that
impredicatively defined properties are acceptable.45 Again, for mereological views
the amount of class comprehension licensed will depend on one’s views and axioms
44See [Uzquiano, 2003] for discussion.
45Certainly this is the case for [Hale, 2013], though the focus there is not an interpretation of proper
classes. [Linnebo, 2006] proposes a theory of properties to facilitate semantic theorising concerning set
theory, but also licenses some additional higher-order comprehension.
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concerning mereology, however the possibility is open to allow some impredicativ-
ity.
For simplicity, we will simply adopt full Morse-Kelly class theory (henceforth
‘MK’), and discuss how much is required for our purposes later (for most appli-
cations, we will require Σ11-Comprehension for classes). We thus might view the
present work as not only providing an interpretation of extension arguments over
V , but also informing what is possible on various class-theoretic approaches. We
start by defining our class theory:
Definition 42. LMK has two sorts of variables, one for sets (denoted by lower-case
Roman letters x, y, z,x0, ...) and one for classes (denoted by upper-case Roman letters
X ,Y ,Z,X0, ...), and a single non-logical relation symbol ∈ that holds between two
variables of the first sort or between a variable of the first sort and second sort.46
MK consists of the following axioms:
(A) Set Axioms:
(i) Set Extensionality
(ii) Pairing
(iii) Infinity
(iv) Union
(v) Power Set
(B) Class Axioms:
(i) Class Extensionality: (∀X)(∀Y )[(∀z)(z ∈ X ↔ z ∈ Y ) → X = Y ] (i.e.
Classes with the same members are identical).
(ii) Foundation: Every non-empty class has an ∈-minimal element.
(iii) Scheme of Impredicative Class Comprehension:
(∀X1), ..., (∀Xn)(∃Y )(Y = {x|φ(x,X1, ...,Xn)}),
where φ is a formula of LMK in which Y does not occur free, may con-
tain both set and class parameters, and in which unrestricted quantification
over classes and sets is allowed.
(iv) Class Replacement: If F is a (possibly proper-class-sized) function, and x
is a set, then ran(F ↾ x) is a set (i.e. {F (y)|y ∈ x} is a set).
(v) Global Choice: There is a class function F such that for every non-empty x
∃y ∈ xF (x) = y. Equivalently, there is a class that well-orders V .47
Before we delve into the details, we provide a sketch of our strategy. Some of the
work and basic ideas occur in [Antos and Friedman, 2017] and [Antos, 2015]. There,
however, additional axioms were required for certain applications48 of the coding.
We will show that within a variant of MK, Hyp(V ) can be coded by a single class.
We then provide some arguments as to how the theory ofHyp(V )might be reduced
to the countable.
46Really, this is not the same as the set membership relation, however we use the same symbol for ease
of expression.
47Note that since Global Choice and Class Replacement imply their set-sized incarnations, we do not
need to include Choice and Replacement in our Set Axioms.
48Namely hyperclass forcing. Antos and Friedman use a version of Class Bounding, equivalent (modulo
MK) to AC∞; a particular kind of choice principle for classes. It is an interesting question (though one
we lack the space to address here) whether or not a Universist should accept that such a principle holds
of V , not least because the principle is necessary for a good deal of mathematical work (see, for example,
[Gitman et al., U]). The coding goes through far more easily with the principle, but since we do not need
it for the purpose of representing extensions of V , we show the coding works without it.
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Figure 4: An example of a tree corresponding to a coding pair showing membership.
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5.3 Coding Hyp(V ) in impredicative class theory
We first need to code the notion of an ordered pair of classes. Initially, this seems
problematic; normal pairing functions on sets are type-raising in the sense that they
have the things they pair as members. We will assume that this is not available on
the current interpretation; most Universist interpretations of proper classes do not
permit proper classes being members and so constructions that are necessarily type-
raising are impermissible. Despite this, we can use the abundance of sets within V
(in particular the closure of V under pairing) to code pairs using a standard trick:
Definition 43. (MK) Let X and Y be classes. We define the class that represent the
ordered pair ofX and Y , or ‘REP (〈X ,Y 〉)’ as follows:
REP (〈X ,Y 〉) = {〈z, i〉|(z ∈ X ∧ i = 1) ∨ (z ∈ Y ∧ i = 2)}
Effectively, we talk about coding an ordered pair of classes by tagging all the
members ofX with 1 and all the members of Y with 2, and referring to the resulting
class. Moreover, short reflection on the above coding shows that it is easy to gener-
alise this to ordered α-tuples by letting α tag α-many copies of V . We are now able to
make use of the following definition (with visual representation of some examples
provided in Figures 4 and 5):
Definition 44. (MK) [Antos, 2015], [Antos and Friedman, 2017] A pair 〈M0,R〉 is a
coding pair iff M0 is a class with distinguished element a, and R is a class binary
relation onM0 such that:
(i) ∀z ∈M0∃!n such that z has R-distance n from a (i.e. for any element z ofM0, z
is a single finite R-distance away from a), and
(ii) let 〈M0,R〉 ↾ x denote the R-transitive closure below x. Then if x, y, z ∈ M0
with y 6= z, yRx, and zRx, then 〈M0,R〉 ↾ y is not isomorphic to 〈M0,R〉 ↾ z,
and
(iii) if y, z ∈ M0 have the same R-distance from a, and y 6= z, then for all v, vRy →
¬vRz, and
(iv) R is well-founded.
These coding pairs shall be essential in coding the structure of ideal sets that
would have to be ‘above’ V were they to exist. One can think of the coding pair as a
tree Twhich has as its nodes the elements ofM0, a top node of a, andR the extension
relation of T. For each tree there are only countably many levels, but each level can
have proper-class-many nodes.
Next, we code the ideal objects using coding pairs. For any particular ideal set x,
we will code the transitive closure of {x}. A fact of the above coding is that any tree
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Figure 5: More complicated coding pair tree structures.
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will havemany isomorphic subtrees, and hence will not be isomorphic to TC({x}).49
We therefore need to form quotient pairs that provide a coding of ideal sets (we pro-
vide a visual representation of an example in Figure 6).
Definition 45. (MK) [Antos, 2015], [Antos and Friedman, 2017] Quotient Pairs. Let
〈M0,R〉 be a coding pair and a be a set inM0. We then define the equivalence class
of a (denoted by ‘[a]’) of all top nodes of the associated coding tree isomorphic to the
subtree Ta:
[a] = {b ∈M0|“〈M0,R〉 ↾ b is isomorphic to 〈M0,R〉 ↾ a”}
Since we have Global Choice, we let a˜ be a fixed representative of [a]. We then
define the quotient pair 〈M˜0, R˜〉 as follows:
M˜0 = {a˜| “a˜ is the representative of the class [a] for all a ∈M0}
a˜R˜b˜ iff “There is an a0 ∈ [a] and a b0 ∈ [b] such that a0Rb0.”
Remark 46. The quotient pairs work by taking fixed representatives of the equiv-
alence class of top nodes of isomorphic subtrees. We then define the relation on
these representatives by searching through the equivalence classes to find a relevant
subtree in which two members of the equivalence class are R-related.
We now have a quotient structure for the coding pairs. Next, we mention some
useful properties of these coding pairs for the purposes of showing that they code
ideal sets:
Lemma 47. (MK) [Antos, 2015], [Antos and Friedman, 2017]50 Let 〈M0,R〉 be a cod-
ing pair. Then the quotient pair 〈M˜0, R˜〉 is extensional and well-founded.
Let us take stock. We have quotient structures of coding pairs that behave exten-
sionally and in a well-founded manner, and are coded by individual classes. We are
now ready to establish a useful theorem, showing that these quotient coding pairs
49See [Antos, 2015] and [Antos and Friedman, 2017] for details and further explanation. We would like
subtrees to correspond to elements in the transitive closure. However, isomorphic subtrees would code
the same element, and so as it stands our coding pairs are not extensional. As we’ll see below, this can be
easily fixed.
50See [Antos and Friedman, 2017], Lemma 2.5.
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Figure 6: The quotient process for a coding pair of 3
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obey certain operations, and thus we have a code for Hyp(V ). We first, however,
explain how we will state what we wish to say.
We will be interested in the theory of these quotient coding pairs, and what codes
they can produce. For ease of proof, we will speak as though they are first-order
objects, despite the fact that we are using this as an abbreviation for class-theoretic
language. We therefore need to make the following:
Remark 48. We will talk about ‘a structure’ (V )+, to be understood as the ‘universe’
of all quotient coding pairs, under a ‘relation’ ∈̂ that we will show satisfies certain
first-order axioms. We will therefore use locutions like “x∈̂y”, “x∈̂(V )+”, and more
generally “φ(x)” for some first-order φ. Really, however, since the objects of (V )+
are ideal, this should all be paraphrased in terms of quotient coding pairs. Though
we deny that we are referring to sets as normally understood, there is no obstruction
to using a first-order language to represent the theory of quotient coding pairs (just
as there is no contradiction in using a two-sorted first-order language in our class-
theory). We therefore make the following definitions:
Definition 49. (MK) Suppose there is a class X coding a quotient pair 〈M˜0, R˜〉,
which in turn codes some x∈̂(V )+. Since it will often be useful to talk about X
coding 〈M˜0, R˜〉 under their presentation as a tree coding x, we say that:
Tx is a quotient pair tree for x iff there is a class X representing 〈M˜0, R˜〉
coding x, and Tx is the tree structure that X exemplifies.
Definition 50. (MK) Say there is a class X coding a quotient pair tree Tx. Then Ty
(coded by a class Y ) is a direct subtree of Tx iff Ty a proper subtree of Tx and the top
node ay of Ty is in the level immediately below the top node ax of Tx.
Definition 51. (MK) Let X and Y code quotient pair trees Tx and Ty respectively.
Then X bears the ET relation to Y iff Ty is isomorphic to a direct subtree of Tx. We
shall also write TyETTx to represent this relation between two classesX and Y , and
will then speak of y∈̂x∈̂(V )+.
Definition 52. (MK) Let X and Y code quotient pair trees Tx and Ty respectively.
Then we say X and Y are quotient pair equivalent (or Tx =T Ty) iff Tx and Ty are
isomorphic.
Definition 53. (MK) (V )+ is the structure obtained by taking as our domain of
quantification all quotient coding pairs over V , our equality relation to be =T , and
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our membership relation to be ET . We will talk about (V )+ using the following
first-order language: A first-order variable x ranges over quotient coding pairs, each
variable can be interpreted as a coding pair 〈M˜x, R˜x〉, that in turn codes a tree Tx.
Membership (denoted by ‘∈̂’) and equality (denoted by ‘=̂’) in are interpreted as ET
and =T respectively.
We are now in a position to establish a theorem that will prove to be very useful
in relating class theory and V -logic. Much of the work is putting together results in
[Antos, 2015] and [Antos and Friedman, 2017]. However, the following (somewhat
lengthy) remark is required to situate the current discussion:
Remark 54. In [Antos, 2015] and [Antos and Friedman, 2017], the first and third au-
thor used an axiomatisation MK∗ that also includes the following Class Bounding
Axiom:
Definition 55. (MK) Class Bounding. ∀x∃Aφ(x,A) → ∃B∀x∃yφ(x, (B)y)
where (B)y is defined as follows:
(B)y = {z|〈y, z〉 ∈ B}.
They also show that, whenworking over a countable transitivemodelM = (M ,∈
, C) such thatM |= MK∗, the model (M+,∈), whereM+ is defined as follows:
M+ = {x| “There is a coding pair 〈Mx,Rx〉 for x in C”}
satisfies SetMK∗: a version of ZFC−Power Set with a Set Bounding Axiom and
some constraints on the cardinal structure of M+. We show that the proofs we re-
quire are (a) amenable to the current context, (b) realisable using an impredicative
class theory, and (c) can be accomplished avoiding the use of Bounding (but with an
assumption on the existence of isomorphisms). For the purposes of the proof, it will
be much easier to speak of the tree structures Tx, Ty , and Tz , rather than constantly
paraphrasing in terms of classes representing the quotient coding structures.
The proofs in [Antos, 2015] and [Antos and Friedman, 2017] rely on the following
two lemmas:
Lemma 56. (MK∗) [Antos, 2015], [Antos and Friedman, 2017] First Coding Lemma.
Let M = (M , C) be a transitive β-model (i.e. it computes well-founded relations
correctly) of MK∗. Let 〈N1,R1〉 and 〈N2,R2〉 be coding pairs. Then if there is an
isomorphism between 〈N1,R1〉 and 〈N2,R2〉 then there is such an isomorphism in C.
Lemma 57. (MK∗) [Antos, 2015], [Antos and Friedman, 2017] Second Coding Lemma.
For all x ∈M+ there is a one-to-one function f ∈M+ such that f : x −→Mx, where
〈Mx,Rx〉 is a coding pair for x.
[Antos, 2015] and [Antos and Friedman, 2017] are concerned with higher-order
forcing (i.e. using forcing posets that have some proper classes of a model as condi-
tions) over models of MK∗. In order to deal with the obvious metamathematical
difficulties, they explicitly define the construction over models satisfying MK∗ that
are countable, transitive, and are β-models (i.e. the models are correct about which
relations are well-founded). Their strategy is to code a model (M)+ of SetMK∗ in
the original model of MK∗, and perform a definable class forcing over (M)+. This
then corresponds to a hyperclass forcing over M. The current work shows that the
coding outlined is not dependent upon the countability of the models, nor the extra
assumption of Class Bounding (though we will motivate the acceptance of the First
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Coding Lemma). Instead, we can take the coding over V using the interpretation
of MK through class theory, and show how to code the theory of (V )+ using these
resources. For the above lemmas then, a few remarks are in order.
(I) The assumption that the model over whichwe code is a β-model is philosophi-
cally trivial in the present setting; we are working over the Universist’s V , with some
conception of its classes CV . For the Universist, (V , CV ) sets the standard for what a
β-model is, and so is trivially a β-model.
(II) Similar remarks apply to the First Coding Lemma, which is a non-trivial result
when we are concerned with a countable transitive model M |= MK∗. Since M
has an impoverished view of what classes there are, in that setting one needed to
establish thatMK∗ satisfaction alone ensures that there is a class of the relevant kind
in C. For the purposes at hand, however, the result is again philosophically trivial;
the relevant classes CV over V set the standard for when two trees representing classes
are isomorphic, and so we cannot have isomorphic trees Tx and Ty for which there
is not a class coding an isomorphism. If there are no things coding an isomorphism
between Tx and Ty then they are simply not isomorphic. To be absolutely technically
explicit about this fact, we will add the First Coding Lemma as an extra axiom, and
denote the theory we work in byMK+.
(III) Use of the Second Coding Lemma is circumnavigated by the proofs below,
and so we will say nothing more about it.
Theorem 58. (MK+) (V )+ satisfies Infinity, Extensionality, Foundation, Pairing,
Union, and∆n-Separation for every n. Rendered in the class theory, this states:
(1.) Infinity+: There is a class representing a tree Tω for ω.
(2.) Transitivity+: For any class X representing a quotient coding pair tree Tx, and
for any class Y representing a quotient coding pair tree TyETTx, then if az is a
node directly below ay in Ty, then there is a class Z coding a direct subtree Tz of
Ty .
(3.) Pairing+: For any classX coding a tree Tx and any class Y coding a tree Ty , there
is a class Z coding a tree Tz such that TxETTz and TyETTz .
(4.) Union+: Suppose that there is a class X coding a quotient pair tree Tx. Then for
any class Y coding a quotient pair tree Ty such that TyETTx, and any classes
coding trees TziETTx, there is a class U∪ coding a quotient pair tree T∪x such
that each TziETT∪x.
(5.) ∆n-Separation+: Suppose that there is a class X coding a quotient pair tree Tx,
in turn coding some x∈̂(V )+. Let φ(y) be a∆n formula in the language of (V )+.
Then there is a class Z coding a tree Tz such that for any class Y coding a tree
Ty (with y∈̂(V )
+) such that TyETTx, if φ(y) holds in the theory of (V )
+ then
TyETTz .
Proof. The proofs of (1.)–(4.) do not even apparently require the use of Class Bound-
ing, and so we refer the reader to [Antos, 2015] and [Antos and Friedman, 2017]. We
thus begin with:
(5.) ∆n-Separation+. This is slightly more difficult in that it is not clear how to
code a first-order formula within (V )+. This is dealt with by the following:
Lemma 59. (MK+) [Antos, 2015], [Antos and Friedman, 2017] Let φ be a∆n-formula
in the language of (V )+. Then there is a formula ψ in the language of classes (and the
trees they code) such that the theory of (V )+ contains φ(x1, ...,xk) iff ψ(Tx1 , ...,Txk).
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Proof. By induction on the complexity of φ. Suppose φ is of the form y∈̂x, and let Ty
and Tx be the associated trees. As y∈̂x, there is a tree Ty′ with top node ay′ in the
level below the top node of Tx, such that Ty is isomorphic to Ty′ . By the First Coding
Lemma (trivial in the current setting), ψ is then “Y is a class coding a tree Ty , and
X is a class coding a tree Tx such that Ty is isomorphic to a class Y ′ coding a direct
subtree Ty′ of Tx”. Suppose then that φ is of the form y=̂x. Then ψ is simply “The
class that codes Ty is isomorphic to the class that codes Tx”, which is again dealt
with by the First Coding Lemma.
For the inductive steps where φ is of the form ¬χ0 or51 χ1 ∧ χ2, the result is
immediate, we just either negate or conjoin the class-theoretic correlate of the χm
provided by the induction step.
Suppose then that φ is of the form ∀xχ, where χ is translatable in our class theory
by χ′. Then ψ is “For any classX coding some tree Tx, χ′(X)”.
We now can proceed with the proof of ∆n-Separation+. Let a,x1, ..,xn be first-
order names in the theory of (V )+ and φ(x,x1, ...,xn, a) be any ∆n-formula in the
language of (V )+. We need to show that:
b = {x∈̂a|φ(x,x1, ..,xn, a)}∈̂(V )+
and hence that there is a classB representing a coding pair for bwith a corresponding
tree Tb.
Let Tx1 ,...,Txn and Ta be codes, that we will refer to using x1, ...,xn and a in the
language of (V )+. Further let ψ be the class-theoretic correlate of φ. If b is empty the
result is immediate as there is a coding pair for the empty set. Assume then that b
is non-empty and (V )+ thinks that b contains some c0 with coding pair tree Tc0 . Let
Ta(c) be a class variable over trees, with the condition that each Ta(c) corresponds to
a direct subtree of Ta (i.e. a(c) is a member of a in (V )+). By Class Comprehension,
there is a class Z such that if ψ(Ta(c),Tx1 , ...,Txn ,Ta) holds then {z|〈c, z〉 ∈ Z} is the
direct subtree Ta(c) of Ta, and if ψ(Ta(c),Tx1, ...,Txn ,Ta) does not hold then {z|〈c, z〉 ∈
Z} = Tc0 .
We then let Tb be a tree with top node b0 that has as all its direct subtrees the
various {z|〈c, z〉 ∈ Z}. The tree Tb then codes the existence of the necessary
b = {x∈̂a|φ(x,x1, ...,xn, a)}∈̂(V )+.
Remark 60. Since we are coding in class theory the theory of (V )+, we have ‘ordi-
nals’ that are ‘longer’ than On. We will refer to ideal ordinals ‘past’ V (i.e. well-
orders in the class theory longer than On) using variants of the Greek letters (such
as ‘κ’, ‘ϑ’, ‘ς ’, ‘̟’ etc.). In discussion of second-order set theory, these are also some-
times referred to as ‘meta-ordinals’.
With these properties in place, we proceed to find a code of Hyp(V ) in (V )+:
Theorem 61. (MK+) (V )+ contains a code for Hyp(V ).
Proof. We begin with the following definition concerning coding pairs:
Definition 62. Σn-Collection
+. Suppose that there is a classX coding a quotient pair
tree Tx, in turn coding some x∈̂(V )+. Let φ(p, q) be a Σn formula in the language
of (V )+. Suppose further that for every Ty coding some y∈̂(V )
+ such that TyETTx,
there is a z∈̂(V )+ (represented by a class Z coding a tree Tz), such that φ(y, z). Then
there is a class A coding a tree Ta and a∈̂(V )+ such that for class B coding a tree
TbETTx and b∈̂x∈̂(V )+, there is a class C coding a tree Tc and c∈̂(V )+ such that
TcETTa, c∈̂a, and φ(b, c).
51The choice of ∧ here was somewhat arbitrary, any suitable connective will do.
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By Theorem 58 we can build versions of the L-hierarchy in (V )+. Moreover,
since Global Choice holds in the class theory, (V )+ contains a class well-order <V
of V . Let L(V )
+
(V ,<V ) then be the substructure of (V )+ obtained by construct-
ing (V )+’s version of the L-hierarchy over (V ,<R) through every meta-ordinal ϑ.
Then L(V )
+
(V ,<V ) validates ∆n-Separation+, since any instance of Separation for
L(V )
+
(V ,<V ) translates into an instance of Separation for (V )+ (this is a more spe-
cific instance of the fact that that LM satisfies Separation whenever M is a tran-
sitive model of Separation). So, pick the least ς such that Lς(V ,<V ) satisfies ∆n-
Separation+. We claim that Lς(V ,<V ) also satisfies Σn-Collection+.
Assume for contradiction that Σn-Collection fails in Lς(V ,<V ). Working from
the perspective of Lς(V ,<V ), we then have a Σn-definable function φ(x, y) from
Ord(V ) unbounded inLς(V ,<V ). We then note that V can bewell-ordered inLς(V ,<V
) and therefore every element of Lς(V ,<V ) can be mapped into Ord(V ) (i.e. Ord(V )
is the largest cardinal of Lς(V )) since ς was chosen to be least. We can then extend
φ(x, y) to a Σn-definable bijection between Ord(V ) and Lς(V ,<V ), to obtain a Σn-
definable well-order<R on the subsets ofOrd(V ) inLς(V ,<V ). For i∈̂I indexing<R
on subsets x0,x1, ...,xi, ... of Ord(V ) we then diagonalise to produce the following
X ⊆ Ord(V ):
X = {α ∈ On|¬α∈̂xα}
This X is Σn-definable over Ord(V ) by the properties of <R and the fact that
Ord(V )∈̂Lς(V ,<V ) but cannot be in Lς(V ,<V ). Since Ord(V )∈̂Lς(V ,<V ), this vio-
lates∆n-Separation+, ⊥.
ThusLς(V ,<V ) satisfiesΣn-Collection+. We then know that since any instance of
Σn-Collection+ inLς(V ) is expressible inLς(V ,<V ), Lς(V ) also satisfiesΣn-Collection+.
Thus, there is some L̟(V ) satisfying ∆0-Separation and Σ1-Collection, with ̟ the
least such.
We can now note the following:
Lemma 63. [Barwise, 1975]52 For any transitiveM,Hyp(M) is of the form Lα(M) for
α the least admissible aboveM.
and thus observe that L̟(V )=̂Hyp(V ). Moving back to the coding, this implies the
existence of a class H coding a tree THyp(V ) forHyp(V ).
The above machinery then provides the resources to code Hyp(V ) by referring
to classes. One natural question is exactly how much comprehension is required to
code proofs in V -logic. This is approximately answered by the following:
Theorem 64. Σ11-Comprehension is sufficient to produce a code forHyp(V ) and∆
1
1-
Comprehension is not sufficient to produce such a code.
Proof. To see that Σ11-Comprehension is sufficient to produce a code for Hyp(V ),
consider H = {x : x∈̂Hyp(V ,<V ) ∧ “x is Σ1-definable in Hyp(V ,<V ) using param-
eters from V ∪ {V } ∪ {<V } ”}. This is an extensional, Σ1-elementary submodel of
Hyp(V ,<V ), since we can choose least witnesses to∆0-formulas to getΣ1-elementarity.
But the transitive collapse ofH must be all ofHyp(V ,<V ) as it is admissible and con-
tains V and <V as elements (and since Hyp(V ,<V ) is the smallest such structure).
We then obtain a code forHyp(V ) as before.
To see that ∆11-Comprehension is not sufficient, note that V together with the
subclasses of V which belong toHyp(V ) forms a model of∆11-Comprehension. This
52See [Barwise, 1975], p. 60, Theorem 5.9.
is a model of∆11-Comprehension with no code forHyp(V ), since there is no code for
Hyp(V ) inside Hyp(V ).
In sum, we have seen thus far that Hyp(V ) can be coded within the class the-
ory licensed by an interpretation of proper classes that admits a small amount of
impredicativity (namely: NBG+Σ11-Comprehension+The First Coding Lemma). We
now turn to the issue of coding V -logic withinHyp(V ) (as rendered in class theory).
5.4 Coding V -logic in Hyp(V )
We will show that if φ is a consequence of a V -logic theory T, then a proof of φ
appears in Hyp(V ) (i.e. the (code of the) least admissible structure containing V ),
completing the rendering of V -logic for the Universist. Much of this goes through
as in [Barwise, 1975], but we have used a slightly different definition of proof code,
and so this remains to be checked.
We wish to show that if there is a proof of φ in V -logic, then there is a proof
code of φ inHyp(V ). First, however, we must be precise about how we interpret the
extended syntax of V -logic. Since we have shown already how to code Hyp(V ), we
work directly in the language ofHyp(V ) and drop the class-theoretic locutions:
Definition 65. (MK+) The language and proofs of V -logic are interpreted as follows
(working in (V )+):
(i) Every set x is named by 〈x, 3〉 (so, for example, if x = ω, then ω¯ = 〈ω, 3〉 (to
avoid the double use of names for natural numbers and the Go¨del coding of
the connectives).
(ii) ∈V and V name∈ and V¯ respectively (remembering that we are currentlywork-
ing within (V )+, and these appear as sets from this perspective).
(iii) The relevant W¯ (and possibly P¯C , G¯C , or any other required predicates) can
be represented by any object not otherwise required for the syntax of V -logic,
so we may use {V }, {{V }}, {{{V }}}, ... and so on (for any Zermelo-style con-
struction of singletons derived from V ).53
(iv) After a suitable Go¨del coding for the connectives and quantifiers has been cho-
sen, we represent well-formed formulas of V -logic with sequences of symbol
codes.
(v) Proofs are represented by the appropriate trees comprising codes of the relevant
sentences as nodes.
We can now state the following:
Theorem 66. (MK+) [Barwise, 1975] Suppose that there is a proof of φ in V -logic.
Then there is a proof code of φ inHyp(V ).
Proof. We credit this to Barwise, since the proof is not very difficult, but since we
have a different notion of proof-code we need to make sure that V -logic is still rep-
resentable in Hyp(V ).
We proceed by induction on the complexity of our proof P . Suppose that there is
a proof P of φ in V -logic. Then either:
53For most axioms we only need one (and at most three) extra predicates, but we make room for the
use of several different outer models in case others wish to talk about relationships between incompatible
extensions using the same axiom.
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(a) P is one line.
(b) P is more than one line.
We deal with (a) first. Suppose that P is one line. Then either (i) φ is of the form
x¯ ∈ V¯ , (ii) φ is an atomic or negated atomic sentence of L∈ ∪ {x¯|x ∈ V }, (iii) φ is
an axiom of first-order logic in L V∈ , or (iv) φ is an additional axiom containing some
extra predicate (such as W¯ , P¯C , or G¯C ).
For (i), suppose φ is of the form x¯ ∈ V¯ for x ∈ V . Then, the result is immediate:
the required sentence is in Hyp(V ) by Pairing, and hence so is the tree coding its
proof (i.e. {{φ}, ∅}). In the case of (ii), φ appears in V , and so it is immediate that φ is
inHyp(V ), with the relevant proof tree. For (iii), we note that that all constructions of
first-order axioms from simpler formulas ψ and χ (that are assumed, for induction, to
be in Hyp(V )) can be chained together through Pairing. For (iv), since we represent
the various extra predicates by objects that are not pieces of syntax in other parts of
V -logic but are in Hyp(V ), any axiom of the form “W¯ is such that Φ” is simply a
finite sequence of sets already present in Hyp(V ) (and similarly when P¯C or G¯C are
present). Again, repeated application of Pairing ensures that φ is in Hyp(V ), as well
as the relevant proof tree.
(b) Suppose then that P is more than one line. Assume for induction that all
prior steps to the final inference to φ have proofs in Hyp(V ). Then either (i) φ is an
axiom, or (ii) φ follows from ψ, (ψ → φ) via modus ponens, or (iii) φ is of the form
∀x ∈ a¯ψ(x) and follows from ψ(b¯) for all b ∈ a by the Set-rule, or (iv) φ is of the form
∀x ∈ V¯ ψ(x) and follows from ψ(x¯) for all x ∈ V by the V -rule.
For each of the steps we need to construct, from the given proof trees, a new proof
tree coding a proof of φ. We already know that the relevant pieces of syntax exist (by
part (a)) and so the challenge is simply in the construction of the trees inHyp(V ).
(i) has already been dealt with in part (a). (ii) Suppose for induction that ψ and
(ψ → φ) have proofs coded inHyp(V ) byTψ = 〈Tψ,<ψ〉 and T(ψ→φ) = 〈T(ψ→φ),<(ψ→φ)
〉. Since we know that Hyp(V ) satisfies finite iterations of Pairing, we only need to
construct Tφ and <φ. We can easily construct Tφ = Tψ ∪ T(ψ→φ) ∪ {φ}. Next, we
define <φ as follows:
x <φ y iff:
(i) x <ψ y, or
(ii) x <(ψ→φ) y, or
(iii) y = φ.
Since we have <ψ and <(ψ→φ) already (Hyp(V ) is transitive), we just need to
construct {〈x,φ〉|x ∈ Tψ ∨ x ∈ T(ψ→φ)}. We have that φ ∈ Hyp(V ), and also for any
object y ∈ Hyp(V ), 〈y,φ〉 ∈ Hyp(V ). We then (working with Hyp(V )) define the
following formula:
χ(x, y) =df x ∈ Tψ ∪ T(ψ→φ) ∧ y = 〈x,φ〉
χ(x, y) is clearly a ∆0 formula defining a function that maps any particular x ∈
Tψ ∪ T(ψ→φ) to 〈x,φ〉. We also have the following lemma:
Lemma 67. (MK+) [Barwise, 1975]54 Σ1-Replacement. Hyp(V ) satisfies Replacement
for Σ1 formulas.
54See [Barwise, 1975], p. 17, Theorem 4.6.
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We thus have {〈x,φ〉|x ∈ Tψ ∧ x ∈ T(ψ→φ)} ∈ Hyp(V ) as desired. 〈Tφ,<φ〉
clearly codes a proof of φ from ψ and (ψ → φ), the proof steps are inherited from the
previous trees, and each proof step prior to φ is <φ-related to φ.
We deal with (iii) and (iv) in tandem. As the strategy is the same for both, we give
only the proof of (iv). Suppose then that φ is of the form ∀x ∈ V¯ ψ(x) and follows
from ψ(b¯) for all b ∈ V by the V -rule. Assume for induction that every ψ(b¯) has a
proof code Tψ(b¯) = 〈Tψ(b¯),<ψ(b¯)〉 ∈ Hyp(V ). We then identify:
Lemma 68. (MK+) [Barwise, 1975]55 Σ1-Collection. Hyp(V ) satisfies Collection for
Σ1 formulas.
Using Σ1-Collection, we have a non-empty set X which contains proofs of ψ(b¯)
for each b, and a non-empty set Y containing the relations of each of the Tψ(b¯). Sepa-
rating out fromX and Y , yields a setX ′ containing just the domains of proof trees of
V -logic proofs in X , and a set Y ′ containing just the relations of V -logic proof trees
in Y . The argument for the full tree of Tφ is then exactly the same as in (ii).
We now are in a position where:
Summary:
(1) Extensions of V can be coded syntactically using V -logic.
(2) Hyp(V ) can be coded inMK+ (in fact,NBG+Σ11-Comprehension+The First
Coding Lemma suffices).
(3) If φ is provable in V -logic, then φ has a proof code inHyp(V ).
Thus consistency and the axioms we have discussed can be coded using MK+
class theory. We could stop here, having shown how the Hilbertian Challenge can
be met for higher-order properties of V , so long as some impredicative class theory
is accepted.56 However, we still need to satisfy the Methodological Constraint, and
it is to this issue that we now turn.
6 Satisfying the Methodological Constraint
We are still left with the question of why we should regard V -logic as capturing the
notion of ‘extension of V ’, rather than merely a gerrymandered syntactic coding.
Resolution of this issue is linked to responding to the Methodological Constraint; if
we can show that truth in V -logic corresponds to truth about actual extensions of
models very similar to V , we would go some way towards establishing that V -logic
stands to arbitrary extensions as the use of forcing relations stands to set forcing
extensions. In this section, we’ll discuss strategies for satisfying the Methodological
Constraint. As we will argue, we can augment our interpretation with methods of
55See [Barwise, 1975], p. 17, Theorem 4.4.
56A slight wrinkle is that though the IMH can be formulated in NBG+Σ1
1
-Comprehension with the
First Coding Lemma, it is always false in models of this form, since the truth predicate obtained through
Σ1
1
-Comprehension implies that there is a transitive model containing every real, which contradicts the
IMH (see [Friedman, 2006], p. 597, Theorem 15 here). However, restricting the IMH to only take into
account outer models satisfying Σ1
1
-Comprehension alleviates this worry (since the proof depends on
considering least outer models that violate Σ1
1
-Comprehension), and this version of the IMH can also be
formalised in V -logic (since V -logic captures any syntactic theory consistent with the initial structure of
V ).
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reducing the theory of V -logic to the countable, thereby yielding an interpretation
satisfying the Methodological Constraint.
Recall the main challenge that we wanted to satisfy:
The Hilbertian Challenge. Provide philosophical reasons to legitimise
the use of extra-V resources for formulating axioms and analysing intra-
V consequences.
The coding performs well with respect to The Hilbertian Challenge in this raw
form. We have provided philosophical reasons to accept the use of MK+ over V
using the mechanisms of class theory. We then showed how to code extensions of
V using V -logic and thatHyp(V ) can formalise the notion of consistency in V -logic.
Since Hyp(V ) can be coded using MK+ over V , we have classes over V that code
consistency in V -logic, and hence discourse about extensions of V . Given the co-
gency of the resources of MK+ (argued for earlier) we can thus see why talk of
extensions will not lead us astray.
The Hilbertian Challenge was, however, tempered by an additional desideratum
on any interpretation of extension talk:
The Methodological Constraint. In responding to the Hilbertian Chal-
lenge, do so in a way that accounts for as much as possible of our naive
thinking about extensions and links them to structural features of V . In
particular, if we wish to apply an extending construction to V , there
should be an actual set-theoretic model, resembling V as much as pos-
sible, that has an extension similar to the one we would like V to have.
As it stands, we do not have a naive interpretation of extensions of V : We are in-
terpreting model-theoretic claims about extensions of V as the syntactic consistency
of theories in V -logic. We would like to find a place for our naive thinking concern-
ing extensions and relate this discourse to our analysis of truth in V . The key fact
here is that Hyp(V ) (and hence claims about consistency in V -logic) is coded by a
single class. As we shall argue, by reducing the theory of Hyp(V ) to a countable
model, we yield an interpretation of extension talk satisfying the Methodological
Constraint.
Recall that for parameter-free first-order truth, the countable transitive model
strategy fared reasonably well, barring its failure to account for greater than first-
order axioms. In responding to the Hilbertian Challenge and trying to satisfy the
Methodological Constraint, we shall thus pursue the strategy of finding a countable
transitive model that mirrors V with respect to the theory of V -logic. As we shall see,
this then facilitates the formulation of axioms about V that make use of extension
talk, whilst finding an arena for our naive thinking.
One might try to argue for the existence of such a countable transitive model in-
formally.57 Fortunately, we can do better in the current context by availing ourselves
57Say by postulating Skolem functions of the required kind. This is a strategy advocated at one stage
by Cohen, for example when he writes:
“The Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem allows us to pass to countable submodels of a given
model. Now, the “universe” does not form a set and so we cannot, in ZF, prove the exis-
tence of a countable sub-model. However, informally we can repeat the proof of the theo-
rem. We recall that the proof merely consisted of choosing successively sets which satisfied
certain properties, if such a set existed. In ZF we can do this process finitely often. There
is no reason to believe that in the real world this process cannot be done countably many
times and thus yield a countable standard model for ZF.” ([Cohen, 1966], p79)
One might adapt this idea to the current context by running a similar argument, but introducing a
predicateH for (the class-theoretic code of)Hyp(V ) into the language of ZFC.
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of the following result:58
Lemma 69. (Folklore)59 ETR (in fact ETR for recursions of length ω) implies the ex-
istence of truth predicates relative to any class.
Lemma 70. (Folklore) ETR is provable in NBG+Σ11-Comprehension.
In particular since Hyp(V ) (coded in the class theory) is a well-founded class
relation, using Σ11-Comprehension we can prove the existence of a truth predicate
relative to this class using ETR. Letting H(x) be a predicate applying exactly when
x ∈ Hyp(V ), and TH be a truth predicate for the language of LNBG ∪ {H(x)}, we
can then prove (using reflection) that there is a Vα that is elementary in V for truth in
LNBG∪{H(x)} (in fact, ETR implies that V is a tower of such universes60). Using the
Lo¨wenheim-Skolem and Mostowski Collapse Theorems over this model (i.e. (Vα,∈
,Hyp(Vα))) yields a countable transitive model V∗ = (V ∗,∈,Hyp(V ∗)) elementary
to V for truth inLNBG∪{H(x)}, and hence the correspondingV∗-logic (formalisable
in Hyp(V∗)) agrees with V -logic. The difference being here, of course, that since
V∗ is countable, the Barwise completeness theorem61 holds, and hence there is a
model very similar to V that is really extended when we consider different kinds of
construction. Put in concrete terms, we have:
Fact 71. (MK+) Let φ be a sentence of V -logic with no constant symbols apart from
V¯ . Then the following are equivalent:
(1.) φ is consistent in V -logic.
(2.) φ is consistent in V∗-logic.
(3.) V∗ has an outer model with φ true.
Thus when we want to know if it is consistent to have an ‘outer model’ of V
satisfying some first-order property mentioning V as a predicate with parameters
definable in V , we can look toV∗ (where extensions are readily available). Of course
one does not consider “extensions of V ” as having anything other than syntactic
meaning, but one can find an exceptionally close simulacrum of this reasoning in the
countable and explain how its truth and structure is related to V (via the correspon-
dence between V and V∗ with respect to first-order and admissible truth). Thus,
by linking V -logic to the countable, we augment our answer to the Hilbertian Chal-
lenge with a response to the Methodological Constraint, explaining the existence of
particular models that closely resemble the naive reasoning with extensions and use
of the term ‘V ’ in set-theoretic discourse.
Omniscience
In the previous subsection, we examined the possibility of reducing the theory of
Hyp(V ) to a countable transitive model V∗. In this subsection, we examine one
further development, namely that if V satisfies certain greater than first-order prop-
erties then the theory of V ’s outer models becomes first-order definable in V .
Are there conditions that V might satisfy allowing first-order access to the theory
of its outermodels? [Friedman and Honzik, 2016a], building onwork of [Stanley, 2008]
examine exactly this. First, however, we note a limitation to any attempt of this kind:
58We are very grateful to Kameryn Williams for discussion here.
59Presentations of both these lemmas are available in [Fujimoto, 2012] (esp. p. 1514) and
[Gitman and Hamkins, 2017] (esp §4).
60See here [Gitman and Hamkins, 2017], p. 129.
61See [Barwise, 1975], p. 99, Theorem 5.5.
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Theorem 72. (ZFC) [Stanley, 2008]62 No first-order hypotheses on V suffice to give
it access to the theory of its outer models. More precisely, assume that:
(i) ZFC∗ is a recursive first-order theory extending ZFC, and that ZFC∗ has
countable standard transitive models.
(ii) good(x) is a parameter-free formula such that ifM is a countable standard tran-
sitive model of ZFC∗, T ∈ M is a set of axioms andM |= good[T], then M has
an outer model that satisfies T.
(iii) bad(x) is a parameter-free formula such that if M is a countable standard tran-
sitive model of ZFC∗, T ∈ M is a set of axioms and M |= bad[T], then M does
not have an outer model that satisfies T.
Then there exists a recursive T ⊇ ZFC∗ such that neither good[T ] nor bad[T ]
holds in any countable standard transitive model of ZFC∗.
The theorem shows that we will never be able to give purely first-order conditions
that give V access to its outer models. However, there is still the possibility that
second-order hypotheses might confer first-order definability on the theory of V ’s outer
models. Indeed this is so (given large cardinals):
Theorem 73. (NBG) [Stanley, 2008] (restated and proved in [Friedman and Honzik, 2016a])
Suppose thatM is a transitive model of ZFC (of which V is one). Suppose that inM
there is a proper class of measurable cardinals, and this class is Hyp(M)-stationary,
i.e. Ord(M) is regular with respect to Hyp(M)-definable functions and this class in-
tersects every club inOrd(M)which isHyp(M)-definable. Then satisfaction in outer
models ofM is first-order definable overM.
What does this theorem show? Namely that if there are classes with certain
slightly greater than first-order properties (the Hyp(V )-stationarity of the measur-
ables is not first-order definable), then there is a first-order formula that captures
satisfaction in outer models of V . Indeed, the consistency strength of outer-model
satisfaction being first-order definable within a model has currently been found con-
sistent relative to the existence of a single inaccessible cardinal.63 This provides a
different perspective on outer model satisfaction, and again shows the relevance of
Hyp(V ): As long as V satisfies the existence of the relevant measurables and their
Hyp(V )-stationarity, then if there is a countable transitive model elementarily equiv-
alent to V for ZFC augmented with a predicate forHyp(V ), then we can behave ex-
actly as if outer models of V actually existed. In this case, our original V, equivalent
to V for first-order truth, would suffice for interpreting extension talk concerning V .
In sum, as long as we have a countable transitive model that sufficiently mir-
rors V , we then have the Methodological Constraint satisfied. Whenever we reason
naively about extensions, we can interpret this as concerned with the relevant count-
able transitive model (i.e. V, or V∗). Here, extensions are uncontroversially avail-
able, and so we may perfectly well reason naively and combinatorially about them,
safe in the knowledge that any facts so discovered will be mirrored by V .
7 Open Questions
Before we conclude, we make a few final remarks concerning salient open questions.
The first concerns what is possible using the mechanisms of V -logic. In this paper,
62This theorem is a quick consequence of the Fixed Point Lemma. See [Friedman and Honzik, 2016a]
for details.
63See [Friedman and Honzik, 2016a] for discussion.
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we have only examined width extensions, and made some remarks about height or
non-well-founded extensions. However, there is some extension talk which seems
to require that V appear non-standard from a different perspective. [Hamkins, 2012]
and [Gitman and Hamkins, 2010] for example consider the following as part of their
Multiverse Axioms:
Axiom 74. Well-foundedness Mirage. Every universe (including V situated inside a
multiverse) is non-well-founded from the perspective of another universe.
One issue here is that V -logic explicitly keeps V standard. While we can interpret
non-well-founded universes using V -logic, as it stands V will always appear in them
as a standard, well-founded part. We then have the following question:
Question 75. How much talk concerning other kinds of extensions of V can be in-
terpreted using V -logic (or similar constructions)?
A further question concerns the role of class theory. Throughout this paper we
have assumed the use of some impredicative class theory. As we indicated, there are
many options for a Universist to interpret impredicative class theory in a philosoph-
ically motivated fashion. Despite this, there will no doubt be some who find the use
of impredicative class theory uncomfortable. We might then, in this spirit, ask the
following question:
Question 76. Howmuch V -logic canwe capturewithout the use of any class theory?
This in turn raises the following problem:
Question 77. How much talk concerning arbitrary extensions can be captured with-
out the use of impredicative classes?
Finally, we recall a previously mentioned open :
Question 13. Could there be a countable transitive modelM = (M ,∈,CM) ofNBG,
such that M has a countable (from the perspective of M) transitive submodel M′ =
(M ′,∈,CM
′
), also a model of NBG, with M and M′ agreeing on parameter-free
first-order truth in ZFC but disagreeing on the IMH?
Conclusions
We have seen that the Universist has some reason to want to use extension talk in
formulating axioms about V . An expansion of logical resources, combined with a
degree of impredicative comprehension, facilitates an interpretation of extension talk
that finds a place for our naive reasoning concerning extensions.
We make some final remarks concerning the state of the dialectic. We wish to be
conservative about the philosophical upshots one should take. What we have estab-
lished is that if one is a Universist, and if one accepts that extension talk concerning V
is worth scrutiny, and if one thinks that the Methodological Constraint is important
in answering the Hilbertian Challenge, and if one regards some impredicative class
theory as legitimate, and if one thinks that we can extend our logical resources using
V -logic, then one can encode a substantial amount of talk concerning extensions of
V using sets from V and/or classes over V , and do so in a way that models similar
to V actually are extended. That is an awful lot of hypotheses, and we should be
mindful of the dictum “one person’s modus ponens is another’s modus tollens”. It
is perfectly within the purpose of the paper for the conclusion to be taken as absurd
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and call for a rejection of one (or more) of the antecedents. One might take the thesis
to show that there is a problem with talking about extended languages or the use of
MK
+. One might think that the Methodological Constraint is too strict, or not strict
enough. Further still, one might take the sheer amount of talk of extensions of V
that can be coded within the Universist’s framework to be evidence of the falsity of
her position. We have not taken a stand on any of these issues here, but have shown
what can be accomplished given the acceptance of certain positions and resources.
Despite this, the fact remains that with a smidgeon of extra expressive resources, the
Universist can utilise far more mathematics than previously thought. The doors are
thus open to new and intriguing philosophical and mathematical discussions.
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